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Abstract 
 
According to the theory of capital as power, capitalism, like any other mode of power, is born 
through sabotage and lives in chains – and yet everywhere we look we see it grow and expand. 
What explains this apparent puzzle of ‘growth in the midst of sabotage’? The answer, we argue, 
begins with the very meaning of ‘growth’. Whereas conventional political economy equates the 
growth with a rising standard of living, we posit that much of this growth has nothing to do with 
livelihood as such: it represents not the improvement of wellbeing, but the expansion of sabotage 
itself. Building on this premise, the article historicizes, theorizes and models the relationship be-
tween changes in hierarchical power and sabotage on the one hand and the growth of energy 
capture on the other. It claims that hierarchical power is sought for its own sake; that building 
and sustaining this power demands strategic sabotage; and that sabotage absorbs a significant 
proportion of the energy captured by society. From this standpoint, capitalism grows, at least in 
part, not despite or because of sabotage, but through sabotage. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The theory of capital as power, or CasP, argues that capitalism, like other historic societies, is 
best examined not as a mode of production and consumption, but as a mode of power.2 To think 
of society as a mode of power is to focus, first and foremost, on the institutions and processes that 
articulate and determine social power. Production and consumption are of course important to 
this articulation and determination – but not exclusively and often inversely.  
The key CasP question is what creorders – or creates the order of – a mode of power. Power 
and resistance to power, we have argued in our work, are dialectically intertwined: without power 
there could be no opposition to power, and without opposition to power, whether blatant or la-
tent, there would be nothing to exert power over in the first place. The two forces imply, negate 
and generate each other in an infinite regress. Now, when we speak of society as a mode of power, 
we describe a social order in which power is able to suppress and prevail over resistance to power, 
and this ability, we maintain, implies and requires what Thorstein Veblen called strategic sabotage. 
In order for power to successfully harness, contain and, if necessary, crush resistance, the power-
ful must constantly restrict, limit and inhibit the autonomy of those with less or no power. More-
over, they must do so strategically: applying too little sabotage might be insufficient to sustain 
their power, while inflicting too much can trigger revolt or, worse still, decimate the very fabric 
of society they seek to control.3 
                                                 
2 The fullest account of CasP is offered in Nitzan and Bichler (2009). Shorter overviews and interviews 
can be found in Bichler and Nitzan (2012a), Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio (2012) and Bichler, Nitzan 
and Dutkiewicz (2013). Bichler and Nitzan (2015b) survey the past, present and future of CasP research, 
while Debailleul, Bichler and Nitzan (2016) articulate some implications. 
3 Note that our notion of strategic sabotage here is broader and somewhat different than Veblen’s. Writing 
at the turn of the twentieth century, Veblen’s main focus was the pecuniary institutions of ‘business’ and 
the ways in which these institutions undermined the universal efficiency of ‘industry’ for redistributional 
ends. In this sense, his conception of sabotage was largely confined to the ‘economic’ sphere of production 
and consumption, investment and waste, credit and finance. The CasP approach, although partly influ-
enced by Veblen, transcends the politics-economics duality from the beginning and is therefore able to 
conceive of sabotage not as an economic tool, but as a lever of power more generally.  
This broader viewpoint reveals significant historical changes in the nature and application of strategic 
sabotage. In the ancient states (as well as in prehistoric societies), power was usually exerted openly, 
directly and violently, and often in ways that seemed arbitrary and random. In later, more complex poli-
ties, however – and particularly in modern capitalism – this exertion became much more opaque and 
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Now, although the nature and impact of strategic sabotage varies significantly from one 
mode of power to another, there are also broad similarities. In all pre-capitalist modes of power, 
strategic sabotage tended to be associated with a fairly rigid societal structure, a relatively stable 
culture and little or no growth in production and consumption. Compared with this record, the 
capitalist mode of power marks an epochal novelty: it represents not only the first historic society 
that is both dynamic and growing, but also the first whose dynamism and growth seem inherent 
to its very logic.  
 
1.1 Energy Capture 
 
The historical record on this matter is unambiguous: over the past three centuries, the structure 
of capitalism has been constantly transformed, its population count gone vertical and its per capita 
energy soared to unprecedented levels. The uniqueness of capitalism in this regard is illustrated 
in Figure 1 and Table 1. 
The figure plots the evolution of the world’s overall energy capture and its components from 
10000 BCE to the present. The term ‘energy capture’ here denotes the entire range of energy types 
converted by human society. The energy sources inputted into – or ‘captured’ by – this conversion 
include biomass, various fuels and different raw materials, while the outputs comprise human 
and animal feed, heating and cooling, material and immaterial objects, physical and virtual trans-
portation – and, last but not least, the energy lost to the conversion process itself (Cook 1971; 
Morris 2013: 53).  
Analytically, we can conceive of overall energy capture as the product of two components: 
the breadth of energy capture, measured by the size of the population, and the depth of energy capture, 
measured by energy capture per person.4 
 
1. 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 
  
                                                   = 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
 
The figure shows the evolution of these three energy-capture series – depth, breadth and over-
all – between 10000 BCE and 2000 CE. The series are rebased with 10000 BCE = 1.0 for easier 
visualization. They are also plotted against a logarithmic scale, so their relative slopes are propor-
tionate to their respective growth rates. Now, although the underlying data are only rough ap-
proximations, the overall picture they portray is clear enough.  
 
  
                                                 
roundabout, far less violent and significantly more systematic. In this latter constellation, sabotage is less 
open and more stealthy: instead of acting positively to affirm and assert the will of the powerful, it operates 
mostly negatively, by preventing, restricting and undermining the actions of those polities’ subjects. It 
also grows less violent: instead of using brute force, it often resorts to temptation, manipulation, mental 
pressure and inbuilt guilt. Finally and crucially, it becomes more methodical: instead of yielding to whim 
and caprice, it progresses deliberately and calculatedly. 
4 Our notions of energy breadth and depth draw on and in some sense overlap with our analysis of capi-
talized power. In this analysis, breadth, measured by the organization’s head count, represents the organ-
ization’s size, while depth, measured by earnings or capitalization per capita, denote its power per ‘unit 
of organization’ (Nitzan 1992; Nitzan and Bichler 2009). 
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Figure 1: World Energy Capture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series are rebased with 10000 BCE = 1.0. Overall energy capture is the product of energy capture 
per capita (Depth) and population (Breadth). Energy capture per capita is the arithmetic mean of Ian 
Morris’s estimates for Western and Eastern energy capture per capita. The yearly growth rates next to the 
series represent geometric means for the relevant periods. 
 
SOURCE: World energy capture per capita is from Ian Morris (2013), The Measure of Civilization: Table 
3.1 (p. 61) for Western estimates and Table 3.4 (p. 111) for Eastern estimates. World population is from 
the US Census Bureau’s tables: ‘Historical Estimates of World Population’ for 10000 BCE to 1940 (mid-
dle estimate for 10000 BCE; lowest estimates for the rest; goo.gl/VeH4YS) and ‘World Population’ for 
1950 to 2000 (mid-year estimates; goo.gl/RvrjLn); both tables were accessed on June 18, 2017. 
 
Table 1: Annual Growth Rates of World Energy Capture (geometric means) 
 
Depth 
(energy capture per capita) 
Breadth 
(population) 
Overall 
(Depth × Breadth) 
1. Prehistory 
10000–5000 BCE 
+ 0.01% / yr 
doubles every 6,932 years 
+ 0.004% / yr 
doubles every 17,329 years 
+ 0.014% / yr 
doubles every 4,951 years 
2. History Before Capitalism 
5000 BCE–1700 CE 
+ 0.03% / yr 
doubles every 2,311 years 
+ 0.08% / yr 
doubles every 867 years 
+ 0.11% / yr 
doubles every 630 years 
3. Capitalism 
1700–2000 CE 
+ 0.55% / yr 
doubles every 126 years 
+ 0.78% / yr 
doubles every 89 years 
+ 1.33% / yr 
doubles every 52 years 
Ratio of Growth Rates 
period 3 ÷ period 2 
18.3 9.8 12.1 
Ratio of Doubling Time 
period 3 ÷ period 2 
0.055 0.103 0.083 
 
Source: Figure 1 
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Most generally, they show three distinct periods: (1) prehistory (till 5000 BCE), (2) history 
before capitalism (5000 BCE–1700 CE), and (3) capitalism (1700–2000 CE).5 During the prehis-
toric period, the breadth and depth of energy capture – and therefore its overall volume – changed 
by very little, if at all (remember through that the data here are very sketchy). The initial acceler-
ation came roughly around 5000 BCE, with the emergence of the early historical modes of power. 
For the first time in the history of their species, human beings found themselves buckled by hier-
archical state structures, and as these structures spread, the depth and breadth of energy capture 
– and hence its overall volume – started to increase.  
But the increase was almost imperceptible. Between 5000 BCE and 1700 CE, the depth of 
energy capture expanded at an annual average rate of only 0.03 per cent. At that rate, it took 
depth more than two millennia to double in size (see Table 1). The average annual growth rate of 
breadth, at 0.08 per cent, was nearly three times faster, while the growth of overall energy was 
pitched even higher, at 0.11 per cent. But even at those faster rates, doubling time was still half a 
millennium or more.  
All of this changed, and rather dramatically, with the rise of capitalism. During the 1700-
2000 period, the depth of energy capture grew at an average annual rate of 0.55 per cent – more 
than 18 times faster than during the previous 6,700 years. The social impact of this change was 
enormous. In the period between 5000 BCE and 1700 CE, it took the depth of energy capture 
2,311 years to double; in capitalism, this doubling period was cut down to 126 years (Table 1). A 
75-year-old person living during the historical period prior to capitalism would have witnessed 
energy capture per capita expand by a mere 2.3 per cent over her entire lifetime; in capitalism, a 
similar person would see this capture rise by as much as 51 per cent! The capitalist acceleration 
of breadth and overall energy capture were equally dramatic: the former grew at an average rate 
of 0.78 per cent annually (nearly 10 times faster than during the historical period before capital-
ism), while the later rose by an average of 1.33 per cent per year (12 times faster).    
 
1.2 The CasP Puzzle 
 
All in all, then, it is clear that, in terms of energy capture, historical modes of power were fairly 
stationary up until the rise of capitalism and explosive thereafter. And here arises a CasP puzzle. 
Rousseau famously observed that ‘Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains’, and the 
same observation can be made about capitalism – only in reverse. According to CasP, capitalism, 
like any other mode of power, is born through sabotage and lives in chains – and yet everywhere 
we look we see it grow and expand.  
How can we explain this apparent contradiction? If capitalism is indeed crisscrossed with 
various forms of strategic sabotage, why is it that, unlike other modes of power, it remains dy-
namic and growing? Maybe the notion of ‘capitalist sabotage’ is a misnomer to begin with? In-
deed, according to many writers, the very growth of capitalist societies attests to their democracy 
and autonomy – just as the very stagnation of traditional societies demonstrates their authoritar-
ianism and subjugation (Huntington 1968). And if that is indeed the case, should we not conclude 
that capitalist sabotage – assuming there is any – is simply too limited to arrest the system’s in-
herent growth drive? Or maybe we are misinterpreting the very nature of capitalist growth and 
                                                 
5 Our choice of 1700 as the ‘beginning’ of capitalism is practical rather than theoretical: regardless of its 
precise birthday, until 1700 capitalism was simply too limited in scope to have a significant impact on the 
world’s average rate of growth. 
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change? Is capitalism indeed unable to exert power – or can it be that, in capitalism, growth itself 
is a lever of power? 
Our purpose in this paper is to examine this apparent puzzle of ‘growth in the midst of sabo-
tage’, and our tentative conclusion is that there is in fact no puzzle at all. The conventional view, 
both mainstream and heterodox, is that capitalism is a system driven by the growth of production 
and consumption, and that, short-term crises and the ups and downs of redistribution aside, this 
growth is ultimately about wellbeing. The very vocabulary of economics determines this conclu-
sion: since the economy is said to produce and consume ‘goods’ and ‘services’, its growth is equiv-
alent to a rising ‘standard of living’, by definition.  
But as we shall show, this habit of thinking might be deeply misleading. And why? Because 
a significant proportion of these so-called goods and services have nothing to do with livelihood: 
their growth represents not the improvement of wellbeing, but the expansion of sabotage itself. 
And if that is in fact the case, it follows that capitalism grows, at least in part, not despite or 
because of sabotage, but through sabotage. 
The paper comprises twelve sections. The two sections following this introduction set the 
stage. Section 2 outlines the CasP claim that capitalized power is augmented by undermining effi-
ciency and growth, while Section 3 presents the opposite notion – namely, that hierarchical power 
is in fact the best way of boosting them. The remainder of the article tries to sort out this apparent 
contradiction. Section 4 begins by examining the connection between power and hierarchy more 
closely, Section 5 continues by contrasting hierarchy and power on the one hand with coopera-
tion and symbiosis on the other and Section 6 assesses how their interaction might have affected 
the evolution of society. Section 7 considers the respective capacities of hierarchical power and 
autonomous cooperation to ‘capture energy’ and the difficulty of measuring these capacities in 
practice, while Section 8 explores why hierarchy requires energy at all. Using and extending these 
analyses, Sections 9 to 11 outline an alternative hierarchy-energy model, delineating and explor-
ing the four hierarchy-energy trajectories a mode of power can follow: expansion, crisis and de-
cline on the one hand, and democratization on the other. Section 12 offers a summary, reflections 
and extensions. 
 
2. Capitalized Power and Economic Growth 
 
2.1 Sabotage 
 
Begin with notion of capitalized power and the imperative of strategic sabotage. According to 
CasP, capitalist power is quantified through differential capitalization. Each owned entity is cap-
italized by the risk-adjusted present value of its expected earnings, and the power that this cap-
italization represents is gauged by relating it to the capitalization of other entities, groups of 
entities or society as a whole. Capitalized entities, subjugated to the imperatives of power, are 
driven to accumulate not absolutely but differentially. Their aim is not to get more wealth per 
se, but to beat the average and exceed the normal rate of return. They seek to expand not faster 
but faster than others, to get not the maximum amount of income and wealth but a bigger share of 
the total. Now, since in the world of capitalized power attempts to beat the average and redis-
tribute profits and assets are inherently conflictual, they always involve strategic sabotage. They 
require limitations, inhibitions and restrictions that boost one’s own earnings and capitalization 
relative to – and often by undermining – those of others. And as the imperative of capitalized 
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power spreads and proliferates throughout society, so do the various forms of strategic sabotage 
on which this power rests. 
The CasP project has identified numerous such paths of differential accumulation through 
strategic sabotage. A partial list of these paths includes higher unemployment that redistributes 
income in favour of capitalists (Bichler and Nitzan 2014a); decelerating employment growth 
that shifts income in favour of the top 1% of individuals (Nitzan and Bichler 2014a) and assets 
in favour of the top 500 companies (Bichler and Nitzan 2016b); higher inflation that tends to 
undermine the standard of living and sense of security of the underlying population while re-
distributing income in favour of capital in general and dominant capital in particular (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2002, 2009); waves of mergers and acquisitions that hinder greenfield investment 
while redistributing income in favour dominant capital (Nitzan 2001); lower growth of plant 
and equipment that, contrary to received convention, accelerates the growth of market capital-
ization (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Bichler and Nitzan 2015a); militarization and the bourgeon-
ing arms trade that fuel conflict while redistributing income in favour of the leading military 
contractors (Bichler and Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 2007); periodic Middle East 
energy conflicts that implode the region and destabilize the world while redistributing income 
in favour of oil-producing governments and the leading armament and petroleum firms (Nitzan 
and Bichler 1995; Bichler and Nitzan 1996, 2015c); the globalization of ownership that pits 
national populations against each other while boosting differential accumulation and deepen-
ing local and global inequalities (Nitzan and Bichler 2002; Park 2013, 2016; Park and Doucette 
2016); rising food prices and higher food-price volatility that cause mass hunger in developing 
countries while raising the differential incomes of the world’s leading grain-trading companies 
and large grain producers (Baines 2014, 2015, 2017); the widespread automation of investment 
algorithms that amplifies financial instability by leveraging the fear-and-greed cycle for differ-
ential gain (Nitzan and Bichler 2014b); the proliferation of junk food that fuels a global obesity 
epidemic while bloating the differential profits of food and pharmaceutical conglomerates (Al-
britton 2009; Bichler and Nitzan 2016a; Howard 2016); the growing restrictions on Holly-
wood’s artistic autonomy that debilitate audiences while reducing the differential risk of the 
major studios (McMahon 2013, 2015); the apartheid regime in South Africa and the occupation 
of Palestine by Israel that for half a century underwrote the differential accumulation of gold-
mining conglomerates in the former and military-financial holding groups in the latter (Nitzan 
1996; Nitzan and Bichler 2001); the incarceration of a record number of Americans to secure 
the country’s deepening income inequality (Bichler and Nitzan 2014b); the advertising that has 
entire societies dance to the capitalized tune of the advertisers (Cochrane 2015, 2016); the re-
distributive role of conspicuous consumption (Di Muzio 2015); the leveraging of government 
debt in favour of the top 1% and their leading corporations at the expense of the underlying 
population (Hager 2014, 2015; Di Muzio and Robbins 2016; Hager 2016); the financial dereg-
ulation that destabilizes the capitalist order while boosting the differential profits of the banking 
sector (Ostojić 2015a, 2015b); the list goes on and on.  
The breadth and depth of these examples leave little doubt: capitalism is indeed born in 
chains and lives in shackles. Strategic sabotage is integral to its very logic and daily practice. 
Everywhere we look, we see capitalized power bound up with restrictions, inhibitions and lim-
itations.  
Now, with these chains and shackles in mind, we should expect capitalism to trip on its 
own bootstraps and be hamstrung by stagnation, recession and hardship. And in many ways it 
is. According to numerous CasP studies, higher capitalized power does tend to correlate with 
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less dynamism and lower growth. But, then, the dynamism and growth, although curtailed, are 
never entirely arrested. While capitalism is probably less dynamic and slower to grow than it 
might be with fewer such impositions, in comparison to other modes of power it still sparkles 
and shines. What, then, is the source of this seemingly unique resilience? What is it that enables 
capitalism to transcend its own power-imposed sabotage and expand faster and more vigor-
ously than any other social system?  
 
2.2 Economies of Scale 
 
Conventional political economists have tried to answer this question, but the way in which 
they pose it in the first place is so different than our own that a brief digression might be in 
order. According to the common view, both mainstream and heterodox, capital is an economic 
category, an entity denominated in units of production and consumption. In this framework, 
power and sabotage are ‘non-economic’ entities and therefore external to accumulation as 
such. In most models they are nowhere to be found. And on the rare occasion that they do 
make an appearance, they are introduced not as inherent forces, but as ‘exogenous shocks’ – 
uncalled-for ‘distortions’, ‘interventions’ and ‘disturbances’ that rattle the system from the out-
side.6  
The distortions created by power institutions and processes are usually thought of as hav-
ing two opposite effects – one negative, the other positive. On the negative side, power is said 
to undermine the proper working of the ‘free market’, frustrate the ‘efficient allocation of re-
sources’ and hinder the production of goods and services, and these negative effects, goes the 
argument, make capitalism less ‘productive’ than it otherwise could be and cause growth to fall 
short of its ‘full potential’. On the positive side, though, capitalist power facilitates the rise of 
large economic organizations, and as some market advocates painfully admit, larger organiza-
tions, particularly those driven by profit, are often more efficient than smaller ones. Market 
advocates might also concede that, under certain conditions, government power, although it 
distorts and undermines private efficiency, can end up boosting the overall efficiency of society 
by mitigating intra-societal conflict and sustaining aggregate demand.7  
This double-sided impact of power had already been pointed out by Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx, but it was only in the early twentieth century, when the large corporation – along with 
big government and large labour unions – first came to its own, that the issue was addressed 
head on. One of the first to do so was Alfred Marshall (1920), who reluctantly conceded that 
the growth of large firms might upset the invisible hand and give rise to a corporate caste. But 
he also insisted that the attendant social inconvenience was nonetheless tolerable – first because 
a corporate caste would be benevolent, and second because large-scale business enterprise tends 
to be more technically efficient and its greater efficiency would more than outweigh its associ-
ated political and market costs. In his opinion, ‘organization’ – an attribute that big firms are 
particularly endowed with – was a ‘distinct agent of production’, on par with land, labour and 
                                                 
6 The inverted commas in this and the following paragraph are meant to flag conventional concepts of 
which we are deeply critical. For a detailed examination, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Chs. 5-8). 
7 The term ‘efficiency’ denotes a ratio of the outputs to the inputs of a given process. Thermodynamic 
efficiency, for example, is the ratio of work output to energy input; technical efficiency is the ratio between 
economic outputs and economic inputs; economic efficiency is the monetary cost of producing a unit of 
output; societal efficiency is the ratio between social outputs and social inputs; labour efficiency is the 
ratio of labour outputs to labour inputs, etc. The precision of these concepts and our ability to actually 
measure them vary greatly (see footnote 23).  
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capital. And given that, according to Marshall, organization ‘aids knowledge’ and is ‘our most 
powerful engine of production’ (p. 115), it follows that, on balance, big business is good for 
society after all.  
And that is not the end of it. According to Ronald Coase (1937), even if large organizations 
are not always more technically efficient (i.e., yielding higher output per unit of input), they still 
tend to be more economically efficient (producing at a lower cost).8 One of the key reasons for 
this latter form of efficiency, Coase argued, is that large organizations are better able to save on 
‘transaction costs’. Inter-organizational transactions, he asserted, are subject to market disci-
pline, which, according to the neoclassical scriptures, means they are the most technically effi-
cient. Unfortunately, though, these transactions are not free, so they make sense only if their 
extra technical efficiency outweighs their additional cost; if it does not, the transactions, alt-
hough more technically efficient, are economically inefficient and therefore better internalized 
as cheaper intra-organizational activity.  
Using such calculus, it is then easy to determine – or so we are told – the ‘proper’ (read 
economically efficient) boundary of the organization. According to Coase, this boundary is set 
at the precise point where ‘the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become 
equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open 
market or the costs of organizing in another firm’ (1937: 395).  
To make this opaque sentence more concrete, think of a McDonald’s outlet. The boundary 
of the firm here is right at the service counter. And how do we know that? Because the employee 
at the cash register receives the hamburger from those who prepared it through an intra-organ-
izational transfer (she just takes it from the rack) and then uses a market transaction to sell it to 
the customer standing on the other side of the counter (in return for money). According to 
Coase, these two facts mean that the transaction costs must be slightly higher than the internal 
costs for the first activity and slightly lower for the second, and this delicate balance-at-the-
margin implies that the economically efficient boundary of McDonald’s can be drawn by con-
necting the counters of its 37,000 restaurants. QED.9 
And here lies the problem. Although popular, this delineation goes the wrong way: instead 
of using McDonald’s actual transaction costs to predict its proper boundaries, it uses the com-
pany’s actual limits to justify the theory of transaction costs. And as we follow this path, we 
end up going in a circle. Modern firms such McDonald’s, ExxonMobil and Google are huge, 
presumably because their size helps them save on transaction costs. And how do we know they 
save on transaction costs? Well, obviously because they are . . . big!  
Economists stick to this tautological defence of corporate size for many reasons, the most 
important of which is that they have no choice. And why not? Because, in practice, Marshall’s 
                                                 
8 Technical efficiency depends only on the relationship between outputs and inputs. Economic efficiency, 
measured by unit cost, depends on both technical efficiency and input prices.  
9 Coase’s transaction-cost analysis was originally developed for business firms but has since been applied 
to the full spectrum of organizations – human and non-human alike. A recent simulation of the evolu-
tionary origin of hierarchy argues that biological networks, from the level of organic molecules and up, 
become hierarchical only in the presence of what the authors call ‘connection costs’. When there are no 
connection costs, claim the authors, these networks tend to develop flat structures (Mengistu et al. 2016). 
In other words, molecules, single-cell organisms and herds of mammals are just like the capitalists who 
own McDonald’s: they all self-organize to minimize their transaction costs in their quest for maximum 
gain.  
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‘organization’ and Coase’s ‘transaction costs’ are difficult if not impossible to quantify.10 This 
opacity is theoretically costly. Since the inputs, outputs and costing of ‘organization’ remain 
elusive, we can say nothing concrete about the respective efficiencies of hierarchical power and 
the flat market, and this inability leaves us right where we started. We still need to explain why 
capitalism, although chained by hierarchical organizational power, remains dynamic and 
growing.  
 
3. Hierarchy for Energy 
 
3.1 Hierarchy as a Necessary Evil 
 
A highly innovative attempt to sort out the puzzle is offered by Blair Fix (2015a, 2015b, 2017). 
Instead of the standard economic route, Fix takes a socio-biophysical one. The laws of thermo-
dynamics, he points out, ‘dictate that any system that exists far from equilibrium must be sup-
ported by a flow of energy’, and since ‘human societies are non-equilibrium systems, it follows 
that energy flows ought [to] play an important part in social evolution’ (Fix 2017: 1).  
According to Fix, economic growth, however measured, involves the conversion of energy, 
and the conversion of energy is always transformative. Economists tend to think of this transfor-
mation in terms of utility: energy from biomass, fossil fuel, light, wind, hydroelectric, thermal 
heat and nuclear power, among other sources, is converted into goods and services, and then 
again, via consumption, into wellbeing. But there is another aspect to this process that economists 
often ignore: when society transforms energy into goods and services, it also transforms its own 
structures. 
In modern society, says Fix, this latter transformation is most evident with respect to the size 
of social organizations, measured by the number of employees.11 He shows that growing energy 
capture per capita goes hand in hand with growing organization size, both absolutely and relative 
to society – or, using our own terminology, that the depth of energy capture is positively correlated 
with the breadth of society’s largest organizations – and that this association is evident both in 
different countries and over time. Based on cross-country data, he demonstrates that higher en-
ergy capture per capita means that (1) fewer people are self-employed and more are working for 
large firms; (2) average firm size gets bigger; and (3) the government’s share of total employment 
rises (Fix 2017: Figure 1, p. 4). These same conclusions are also evident temporally, particularly 
in the United States, where long-term time-series data enable us to trace the evolution of these 
energy-linked processes back to the late nineteenth century (Fix 2017: Figure 2, p. 5; see also the 
pooled cross-section/time-series charts in Figure 3, p. 6).  
What drives this double-sided transformation? Why does the growth of energy capture per 
capita (depth) go hand in hand with the growth in the number and size of large capitalist firms 
and governmental organizations (breadth)? According to Fix, the answer is that the two processes 
are locked in an ‘energy feedback loop’ (our term): larger organizations are able to capture (and 
also tend to consume) more energy per capita than smaller ones (2015a: 26).  
What makes larger organizations more effective energy converters – i.e., able to capture more 
energy per capita? In Fix’s view, the main reason is that they are more hierarchical. Greater energy 
                                                 
10 On the difficulties with Marshall’s organization, see Wicksell (1935: Vol. 1, p. 107; quoted in Asima-
kopulos 1978: 370). On the problem of measuring Coase’s transaction costs, see Buckley and Chapman 
(1997: 339-341) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 339-341). 
11 Fix refers to organizations, perhaps too broadly, as ‘institutions’. The difference between the two concepts 
is important and we deal with it in Section 3.2. 
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capture per capita, he posits, requires humans to coordinate their activities on an increasing and 
ever more complex scale. Biology, though, has made them ill-equipped for the job. According to 
Dunbar (1992), the relative size of their neo-cortex prevents them from maintaining more than 
150 direct personal relationships, give or take (‘Dunbar number’), and this restriction limits the 
natural size of human groups. In this sense, we can say that large-scale economic organizations – 
and therefore the ‘economies of scale’ they presumably give rise to – are rather unnatural.  
But society, Fix points out, can bypass this genetic limitation. As Turchin and Gavrilets 
(2009) explain, instead of relating to each other directly in a flat network, people can be forced to 
connect indirectly, via hierarchies. Now, unlike flat personal relationships, says Fix, hierarchical 
structures can maintain a large number of indirect connections without requiring any one indi-
vidual to keep more than a few direct ties (in this case, with superiors and subordinates). And 
when the natural limit is so transcended, the size, scope and complexity of social organizations – 
and by extension, the depth and breadth of their energy capture – can be increased dramatically. 
In Fix’s account, then, capitalist growth is not only consistent with the imposition of hierarchical 
power, it pretty much requires it.  
To recap: according to Fix, social evolution, like all evolution, hinges on energy flows; the 
greater the energy being converted, the more complex the process of capturing it must be; com-
plex processes necessitate social coordination, and the more complex they are the greater the 
coordination they require; human beings, though, are not hard-wired for this task, which is where 
social hierarchy comes into the picture: by linking people indirectly and impersonally, it enables 
coordination on a large scale.  
Seen from this viewpoint, hierarchy is a necessary evil: a power institution that society must 
be shackled to in order to produce more energy. In this context, firms and governments can be 
viewed as ‘the modern embodiment of social hierarchies’, ‘tools of social coordination’ whose 
growth is akin to ‘an investment in social hierarchy [. . .] necessary to mobilize increasing flows 
of energy’ (2016: 14; 2017: 10). This argument is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: From Energy Conversion to Hierarchical Organization 
 
 
3.2 Organizations and Institutions  
 
Now, if Fix is right, his research might turn out to be the opening salvo for a much bigger inquiry. 
The reason is that, while his theoretical argument refers to institutions, his empirical research fo-
cuses only on formal organizations, particularly corporations and governments, and this difference 
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is more than semantic. ‘Institution’ is a loose term that denotes a set of practices, customs, rela-
tions and patterns. We might say that every formal organization is an institution, but not every 
institution is a formal organization. For example, the capitalist market, understood as a social 
totality, is an institution but not a formal organization – though actual markets are often orga-
nized by firms and governments. Similarly, systems of belief and thought, such as religion or 
science, are institutions but not formal organizations – although belief and thought can be fixed 
by formal organizations like a church or a state-run research and education system.  
This distinction is important because institutions, just like organizations, can be highly hier-
archical. Take the so-called capitalist market. In received theory, the market is a flat institution, 
comprising numerous buyers and sellers whose actions are independent of each other and whose 
size is too small to individually alter the overall outcome. In the actual world, however, the mar-
ket is anything but flat. Judging by the level of income and asset inequality among households, 
the differential capitalization of firms and the complex ownership, business and regulatory ties 
between different groups and organizations, we can say that the actual market is always hierar-
chical.  
And institutional hierarchy is by no means limited to the market proper. Recent advances in 
network science show that many growing associations – including those whose evolution is often 
thought of as spontaneous and voluntary, from the internet and World Wide Web, to aviation 
routes and NGO ties, to production chains, academic publications and terrorist organizations – 
end up developing into so-called scale-free networks. The term ‘scale-free’ here indicates that the 
size of the nodes, measured by the number of their connections, does not have ‘typical’ scale. 
Instead of following a bell-shaped distribution, it obeys power laws, with a small number of very 
large hubs dominating a countless mass of smaller nodes. So here too we have hierarchy.12  
Now if seemingly loose associations can be just as hierarchical as formal organizations, Fix’s 
thesis should be applicable, at least in principle, to the capitalist market and its related institutions 
as well as to formal organizations such as corporations and governments. And if we expand the 
vista in this way, the questions become much more involved. For instance, does the evolution of 
market and other institutional hierarchies complement or substitute for the development of or-
ganizational hierarchies? In other words, do the growth rates of formal and informal hierarchies 
move together or inversely? And, by extension, should we expect higher energy use per capita to 
be associated with an increase in both institutional and organizational hierarchy – or can this rise 
be associated with one or the other? To ignore these questions is to risk misattributing to organi-
zational hierarchies effects that in fact emanate from broader institutional hierarchies, particularly 
since the scope of these latter hierarchies appears to have expanded significantly over time. 
On a civilizational scale, the complex hierarchical linking of people, organizations and insti-
tutions in contemporary capitalism seems unprecedented. According to Taagepera (1997), over 
the past five millennia the effective number of distinct polities in the world has declined exponen-
tially – dropping by two orders of magnitude based on population size, and by five orders of 
magnitude based on geographical area. Interestingly and significantly, the last two of the five 
orders of magnitude were shaved off in the past two centuries alone – i.e., during the capitalist 
epoch. This decline in the number of polities, compounded by accelerating population growth, 
has caused the absolute size of polities to increase exponentially, and as the polities have grown 
                                                 
12 Barabási and Albert (1999). For an accessible history of network theory, and particularly scale-free 
networks, see Baraba ́si and Bonabeau (2003) and Baraba ́si (2014). On network hierarchies, see Faul 
(2016). A study of global corporate ownership networks is offered in Vitali, Glattfelder and Battison 
(2011). 
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larger and larger, their internal structure has become progressively more hierarchical (Turchin 
and Gavrilets 2009).  
Capitalism, we argue, has augmented this trend toward broader hierarchies in two important 
ways. First, the rapid spread of the price mechanism means that every new commodified rela-
tionship is automatically added to the expanding scale-free network of differential capitalization. 
Second, the globalization of trade, production and particularly ownership, along with the expan-
sion of transnational organizations and institutions, enables hierarchies to easily ‘jump’ political 
borders in ways that were previously possible only through the cumbersome venues of elite mar-
riage, formal treaties or military conquest.  
 
3.3 Full-Spectrum Hierarchy 
 
From this viewpoint, the capitalist creorder can be conceived of as a full-spectrum hierarchy, an 
ever-changing enfoldment of vertical structures nested within other vertical structures. Ranking 
the different hierarchies of capitalism from the most abstract down to the most concrete, we can 
say that the more concrete hierarchies are regulated by – and in this sense enfolded in – the more 
abstract ones. A simplified illustration of this enfoldment is shown in Figure 3: the lowest level 
comprises micro hierarchies; the micro hierarchies are nested in meso hierarchies; and the meso 
hierarchies are themselves encompassed by the meta hierarchies. 
 
 Figure 3: The Full-Spectrum Hierarchy of the Capitalist Creorder 
 
What do the different levels consist of? Begin with the most abstract, meta hierarchies. The 
hubs of these hierarchies comprise the foundational institutions of capitalism, including, among 
others, the notion of ‘liberty’ (the differential Latin libertates fused into a universal notion of free-
dom), the concept of ‘private property’ (the negative Latin privatus inverted into a positive notion 
of possession), the idea of ‘investment’ (the feudal power of investiture reincarnated as a productive 
act) and the ritual of ‘capitalization’ (the ancient Mesopotamian caput, or head, made into a frac-
tal-like algorithm of power) (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 26, 227-228; Part III). The nodes of the 
meta hierarchies are the broad facets of society – the various dimensions of culture, ethnicity, 
religion and nationalism, among other things. And the links that tie the hubs to the nodes are the 
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conduits through which the former gradually, and with plenty of setbacks and reversals, mould, 
leverage, internalize and encompass the latter.13 At the meso level, the hubs are capitalist polities, 
corporations and NGOs, the nodes are individual subjects and the links are the capitalist institu-
tions, patterns of thought and modes of behaviour that weave them into shifting hierarchies. And 
it is only at the lower, micro level of this full-spectrum enfoldment that we find the inner structures 
of organizations examined by Fix.  
So if Fix is right in arguing that greater energy capture per capita requires more hierarchical 
coordination, we can go even further: we can hypothesize that, as the capitalist mode of power 
deepens and globalizes, a significant – and perhaps growing – proportion of this hierarchical co-
ordination will occur outside the boundaries of formal organizations. It will take place not only at 
the intestinal micro hierarchies of corporations and governments, but also – and increasingly so 
– at the meso and meta levels of scale-free networks: the hubs and nodes here are the foundational 
institutions of capitalism, the broad cultural and political facets of societies and their basic organ-
izational units, while the connecting edges are trade, production and ownership ties, the various 
media of ideology, religion and education, the law and, ultimately, the threat of force and vio-
lence. 
 
3.4 Going the Other Way  
  
Now, up utill now, our story has focused on production and energy: the driving force of society, 
we have claimed, following Fix, is to capture or convert more energy; more energy requires 
broader and more complex coordination; and the most effective way to achieve such coordination 
is through hierarchy. In short, in order to understand hierarchy we need to ‘follow the energy’.  
But this directive – although consistent with the facts – does not really address the basic ques-
tion of our article. It explains how power can emerge from a growth-driven society, whereas CasP 
seeks to decipher the opposite link – namely, how growth can arise from a power-driven society. 
Recall our starting point. Historical systems, we have argued, are best analysed not as modes 
of production and consumption, but as modes of power. And this claim is not based on a whim. 
The primacy of organized power goes all the way back to the beginning of written history, if not 
earlier: it has prehistoric lineages (Price and Feinman 2010); it is amply evident in the first city-
states and empires of the Near East (Frankfort et al. 1946); it reappears, independently, in every 
early civilization (Trigger 2003); and it has continued to dominate the organization of society, at 
almost every level, ever since. Modes of power, we posit, rely on strategic sabotage, so it is hardly 
surprising that most of them have been relatively stationary and experienced only limited growth 
in energy capture per capita (Figure 1 and Table 1). The exception to this rule is capitalism, which, 
compared to previous modes of power, is highly dynamic and grows rapidly. From our view-
point, therefore, the question is not why capitalism needs power in order to grow – simply because, 
in our opinion, capitalism, like other modes of power, is not driven by growth in the first place. 
The interesting question, rather, is why capitalism, although propelled by power, ends up growing 
despite the strategic sabotage that this power requires and entails. Given these considerations, 
                                                 
13 Think of how the fractal-like sprawl of concepts such as ‘financial accounting’, ‘investment’ and ‘capi-
talization’ penetrate and permeate all levels of business – from the small grocery store, family firm and 
largest conglomerate, to mutual, pension and sovereign wealthy funds, to patents and copyrights – as well 
as other social institutions and organization, such as the military (the capitalized ‘quantity’ of the military 
arsenal and the ‘return on military assets’), organized religion (‘Islamic finance’ and ‘faith-based funds’), 
NGOs (‘cultural’ and ‘social capital’), workers (‘human capital’) and so on (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Ch. 
9).  
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then, is it possible that, instead of hierarchy propelling growth, it is actually growth that boosts 
hierarchy?  
 
4. Power for the Sake of Power 
 
4.1. The Mega-Machine 
 
Begin with Lewis Mumford. His book Technics and Human Development: The Myth of the Machine 
(1967) offers a novel interpretation of the early rise of power civilizations – or states – in the Fertile 
Crescent. The rulers of these ancient states, he argues, discovered the eternal cosmos and began 
to unlock some of its secrets, and this breakthrough has had far-reaching dialectical consequences. 
On the one hand, it enabled those rulers to leverage energy in ways that were previously unimag-
inable, while on the other, it showed them that, compared to the vast cosmos, they themselves 
were utterly insignificant. The result was a massive cognitive dissonance – an acute tension be-
tween infinity and nothingness, creation and termination, omnipotence and mortality – and ac-
cording to Mumford, this dissonance subjected those early civilizations to a totally new obsession: 
power for the sake of power.  
To manifest their newly found prowess while alleviating their fear of death, the rulers of these 
societies started to play god. And they did so, says Mumford, by constructing a social ‘mega-
machine’, a highly mechanized hierarchical structure that sought to mirror their own cosmos and 
make them – the mega-machine’s overlords – appear omnipotent and immortal.  
The visible footprints of this mega-machine were phenomenal by prehistoric standards. The 
subjects of the mega-machine were forced to toil in the fields, dig canals, build complex irrigation 
systems and large granaries, construct huge palaces, temples and megalomaniacal graves and, 
last but not least, become cogs in large standing armies. Moreover, their endeavours mobilized 
energy at levels that earlier Palaeolithic and Neolithic societies could not even fathom. But ac-
cording to Mumford, these were all means to an end. The ultimate goal was not to capture energy 
or transform the physical environment, but to make the mega-machine rulers feel almighty, divine 
and, above all, eternal.  
This power impulse, we argue, continues to permeate all so-called civilized societies, includ-
ing capitalism.14 Indeed, on this count capitalism has only upped the ante. Over the past two 
centuries, it has given rise to a new mega-machine whose social and energy scales surpass those 
of all of its predecessors combined (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Ch. 13). And here too, we maintain, 
the ultimate driving force is not faster energy conversion or a higher ‘standard of living’ – although 
both are important by-products – but the augmentation of power as such.  
To augment capitalized power means to overcome resistance. It requires dispersed popula-
tions to be physically or virtually concentrated and institutionally locked into a controlled social 
grid – and that transformation is rarely if ever driven from below. Peasants do not volunteer to 
become urban masses, and urban masses do not rush to become nodes in capitalist hierarchies. 
They have to be expelled and lured, tempted and conditioned, threatened and forced. Moreover, 
once instituted, the imposition of organized power tends to become self-perpetuating. On the one 
hand, those who impose power cannot stop doing so: gripped by a Gilgameshian fear of death, 
they are compelled to pursue power at all costs; and haunted by the Hobbesian threat of counter-
power, they cannot relent, even for a fleeting moment – for if they do, they quickly fall prey to 
                                                 
14 Mumford’s The Pentagon of Power (1970) extended his mega-machine theory to the modern state, but 
not to capitalism more broadly.  
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other power-hungry rulers who do not. On the other hand, those on whom power is imposed 
tend to resist it – though their resistance is usually internal to the power struggle itself. In most 
cases, their resistance fails, and even when it succeeds the end result usually is not the abolition 
of power, but a new form of power. It seems that once power-for-the-sake-of-power gets a hold 
of society, it becomes self-propelling, difficult to stop and nearly impossible to eliminate.  
 
4.2 The Hierarchy of Evil 
 
Seen from this viewpoint, the ultimate role of hierarchy is to augment not efficiency or the capture 
of energy more broadly, but power itself. One of the first modern thinkers to understand this role 
was Estienne de La Boétie, a contemporary of Niccolò Machiavelli. His tract on the subject, 
titled The Politics of Obedience (1975), was published in 1552-53, a bit after Machiavelli’s The Prince 
(1532), but the two works could not have been more different. In fact, their respective purposes 
were totally opposite: whereas Machiavelli’s offered a universal how-to guide for the power-hun-
gry ruler, de La Boétie’s focused on undoing tyranny and domination in the first place.  
Contrary to received opinion, says de La Boétie, tyrannical power does not rest on open 
force, at least not directly:  
  
Whoever thinks that halberds, sentries, the placing of the watch, serve to protect and 
shield tyrants is, in my judgment, completely mistaken. These are used, it seems to me, 
more for ceremony and a show of force than for any reliance placed in them. [. . .] It is 
not the troops on horseback, it is not the companies afoot, it is not arms that defend the 
tyrant. (de La Boétie 1975: 71) 
 
The real bulwark of tyranny is the ‘hierarchy of evil’ (our term): 
 
This does not seem credible on first thought, but it is nevertheless true that there are only 
four or five who maintain the dictator, four or five who keep the country in bondage to 
him. [. . .] These six manage their chief so successfully that he comes to be held account-
able not only for his own misdeeds but even for theirs. The six have six hundred who 
profit under them, and with the six hundred they do what they have accomplished with 
their tyrant. The six hundred maintain under them six thousand, whom they promote in 
rank, upon whom they confer the government of provinces or the direction of finances, 
in order that they may serve as instruments of avarice and cruelty, executing orders at 
the proper time and working such havoc all around that they could not last except under 
the shadow of the six hundred, nor be exempt from law and punishment except through 
their influence. The consequence of all this is fatal indeed. And whoever is pleased to 
unwind the skein will observe that not the six thousand but a hundred thousand, and 
even millions, cling to the tyrant by this cord to which they are tied (de La Boétie 1975: 
71-72). 
 
4.3 Hierarchy as a Modular Information Field 
 
To borrow David Bohm’s quantum theory metaphor, we can think of de La Boétie’s hierarchy 
of evil as an ‘information field’ (Bohm 1980; Bohm and Peat 1987). Topologically, hierarchy 
constitutes a symbolic order that serves to define, enfold and direct a concrete structure of societal 
institutions, organizations and people. This symbolic order allows rulers – from ancient emperors 
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and liberal prime ministers, through capitalist owners and top executives, to army officers, reli-
gious leaders and organized-crime lords – to control the actual structure with minimal energy of 
their own. Like Master Blaster in Mad Max’s Beyond Thunderdome – the brainy dwarf riding the 
shoulders of the mentally handicapped giant – they exert power not directly, but remotely: they 
use the symbolic topology as an Archimedean lever of concrete power, dispatching ‘smart’ low-
energy information signals to unleash and direct the ‘dumb’ high energy of the social structure as 
a whole.   
One of the most important power traits of hierarchy is that it can be made highly modular 
and therefore easy to discipline and quick to reconfigure. The following description of the Mongol 
army of the thirteenth century, taken from Malcolm Bosse’s The Warlord (1983), depicts the su-
periority of a standardized, fully automated war machine: 
 
For one thing we can’t even comprehend their discipline. They were formed into pre-
cise units [. . .]. There were ten thousand troops to a touman; that was their army corps. 
In the touman there were ten regiments of one thousand each, ten squadrons of one 
hundred each, ten troops of ten men each. Exactly. [. . .] No more or less. They were 
kept at full strength. If they had too many men, they waited in the rear – too few, they 
broke up the touman and set it to the rear also. In other words, to maintain their order, 
they’d risk going into battle with fewer men. [. . .] They must have been magnificent 
coming across the plain. [. . .] Approaching the enemy, the rear ranks advanced 
through the front ones and shot their arrows, retiring then to let the front ranks go to 
work. Fire and shock tactics [. . .]. When a superior force charged them – and they 
were usually outnumbered – they retreated by signal, regrouped by signal, turned and 
fired from a distance. Their tactics prevented wholesale slaughter of their own troops. 
They were never trapped, never annihilated, although sometimes outnumbered ten, 
fifteen to one. They never failed to execute any of their own who showed a moment 
of hesitation. They never spared the enemy, but killed their prisoners, cutting off the 
ears and sending them home to the Great Khan like tribute from kings. They were the 
greatest warriors of all time. (1983: 517-518) 
This example serves to distil the two-way relationship between energy and hierarchical 
power. On the one hand, armies are pure power organizations. Their purpose is not to create, but 
to destroy, so the energy captured by their particular structure is a means of exerting power, by 
definition. On the other hand, since all armies are structured hierarchically, and since the role of 
armies is to destroy other armies, there is good reason to conclude that hierarchy offers the most 
effective way of converting and exerting energy for violent ends – for if it did not, hierarchical 
armies would have been defeated and replaced by flatter ones.15   
Or would they? 
  
  
                                                 
15 The emphasis on the destructive nature of hierarchy dates back to the early European bourgs, when the 
budding bourgeoisie portrayed its seemingly ‘flat’ market as a constructive alternative to the havoc 
wrecked by vertical feudal structures. Although contemporary capitalism can scarcely be described as flat 
and constructive (if it ever was), its antiquated self-portrait as a benevolent system continues to define the 
collective consciousness. 
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5. Cooperation 
 
5.1. Anabasis 
 
An interesting counterexample is offered by Xenophon’s Anabasis, or The March of the Ten Thou-
sand (1901; for a detailed analysis, see Lee 2007). Anabasis, which means an expedition from the 
coastline to the interior, is a tale of a military campaign gone wrong. Written by one of its partic-
ipants, it narrates the historical journey of a Greek mercenary army, retained at the end of the 
fifth century BCE by a claimant to the Persian throne keen to unseat his brother. The expedition 
itself failed miserably, with the aspiring claimant and his entire military command slain and their 
ten thousand ‘special forces’ left stranded deep in hostile Persian territory. And that’s when the 
story got interesting.  
Surrounded by a far larger army, deprived of provisions and with no commanders to tell 
them what to do, the ten thousand seemed pretty much doomed. And yet, miraculously, they 
managed to beat the odds. They embarked on a long retreat, fighting their way back to Greece, 
which they eventually reached with relatively limited causalities.  
How did they pull it off? Obviously, it wasn’t their energy capture that saved the day: given 
that their breadth of energy capture (number of soldiers) was roughly 100 times smaller than that 
of the Persians, and since their depth of energy capture (energy per capita) was more or less the 
same, their overall energy capture was most likely two orders of magnitude smaller. The key, 
rather, was the way in which they put their energy to use. 
Based on Xenophon’s account, their success could be attributed, at least in part, to the man-
ner in which they reorganized their army, contemplated their retreat and executed their plans. 
Their novelty was to introduce a second organizational dimension. While the Persian military 
was structured as a one-dimensional hierarchy of submissive cogs, the Greek mercenaries devel-
oped a two-dimensional modus operandi. When in combat, they acted hierarchically. But when 
they strategized, they did so as a ‘marching democracy [. . .] deliberating and acting, fighting and 
voting; an epitome of Athens set adrift in the center of Asia’ (from Carleton Brownson’s 1922 
introduction to his translation of Anabasis, quoted in Lee 2007: 9).  
The democratic impulse came from the soldiers themselves. Although tainted by the lure of 
loot, they still carried, however loosely, the ethos of Greece’s demos-kratia – the idea that society 
should be ruled directly by its own members. This democratic ethos conditioned them to assume 
personal responsibility and cooperate as autonomous beings, which made them not only far better 
soldiers individually, but also a more effective fighting force than the imperial mercenary- and 
slave-based armies around them. 
Modern interpreters have often minimized the extent of this democratic moment. But even 
if limited, its very presence must have had a critical impact. The challenge for the retreating ten 
thousands was not only the overwhelming force of their opponent, the hostility of the local pop-
ulation and the difficult terrain, but also the genuine uncertainty of what might lie ahead. Conse-
quently, they needed to continuously creorder their warpath. They had to look forward, ponder 
alternatives and weigh the odds. They had to invent new military tactics and come up with inno-
vative logistic solutions. And last but not least, they had to constantly motivate and propel them-
selves, lest they sink into despair.  
A hierarchical mega-machine of obedient soldiers cannot operate in this way. Its size and 
discipline allows it to deal powerful blows, and if modularly structured like Genghis Khan’s army, 
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it can also be quickly realigned for added flexibility. But the built-in subservience of its compo-
nents makes it unable to creorder its own logic – and that is the key here. This inability might not 
be much of a handicap under relatively predicable circumstances. But when the conditions 
change radically and unpredictably, creativity becomes essential, and it is here that the Greek 
mercenaries had a clear differential advantage: socialized in the cultural context of a self-reflecting 
autonomy, they were able to operate democratically as well as hierarchically (electing their own 
officers, among other things); the combination of these two dimensions in turn allowed them to 
fuse the creative potential of autonomous cooperation with the decisive force of hierarchical com-
mand; and this fusion enabled them to use their energy much more effectively than their far larger 
yet more rigid hierarchical opponent. 
Now, admittedly, this is only one counterexample.16 But it is worth telling because it illus-
trates a general principle: autonomous cooperation is inherently more flexible than hierarchical 
command. As demonstrated by Anabasis, autonomously organized groups can resort to hierarchy 
if they deem it necessary to do so, but hierarchical groups cannot suddenly become autonomous.17 
And if autonomous cooperation can boost the effectiveness of even the most destructive of all 
human undertakings, what might it do to constructive organizations and institutions? 
 
5.2 From Power to Cooperation 
 
Liberal political economy, particularly its neoclassical dogma, loves to deride both hierarchy and 
cooperation: the former is seen as a remnant of the ancien régime, the latter as a socialist menace, 
and both as immoral, unjust and, in the final analysis, inefficient. A much better – in fact, the best 
– regulatory mechanism, argue the liberals, is a Hobbesian economic war of all against all (perfect 
competition). In this cruel cosmos, courtesy of Malthus, Darwin and Spenser, the fit survive and 
the unfit perish. And since to be fit in this world means to be productive and efficient, the never-
ending economic combat, mediated by the invisible hand (supply and demand), ascertains the 
best of all possible worlds (an upward-spiralling Pareto-Optimal equilibrium).  
As noted in Section 2, this official fundamentalism started to soften at the turn of twentieth 
century, when Alfred Marshall and Ronald Coase used ‘organization’ and ‘transaction costs’ to 
bring both hierarchy and cooperation into the neoclassical fold. And there was good reason for 
this softening. The global crisis of capitalism, together with the rise of communism and fascism, 
coincided with a broader contestation of the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview. Pitted against the 
competitive, bottom-up mechanical cosmos, there emerged a more ‘biological’ approach with 
                                                 
16 The tale of Anabasis indeed seems unique. Consider for example the famous 8th Guards ‘Panfilov’ Rifle 
Division, which, similarly to the ten thousand Greeks, found itself under siege during the 1942 Battle of 
Moscow. Its story, immortalized in Bek and Baurdzhan’s Volokolamsk Highway (1969, originally published 
in Russian in 1944), glorified the unbroken spirit of the ‘popular’ Soviet army and was later used as a 
template for organizing leftist guerrillas, freedom fighters and revolutionary undergrounds around the 
world. But the similarity with Anabasis is superficial at best. Leaving aside the fact that much of the book’s 
plot was cynically fabricated by Stalin’s propaganda machine, the picture it portrays has nothing to do 
with democracy and autonomy. Panfilov’s was a highly hierarchical army reigned by fear and terror. The 
invigilating politruks terrified the commanding officers, who in turn threatened and penalized their rabble 
soldiers. Small violations were severely punished and executions were common. This modus operandi 
has little in common with that of the retreating Greek mercenaries. If anything, it resembles the German 
withdrawal from Russia as narrated by Remarque’s A Time to Live and a Time to Die (1954), or the modern 
feudal-like Russian army described by Babchenko’s One Soldier’s War in Chechnya (2008). 
17 Technically, if we denote all possible forms of command-based organizations as set c and all forms of 
autonomous organizations as set a, we can say that c can be made a subset of a (𝑐 ⊂ 𝑎). For our purpose 
in the remainder of the paper, though, we treat the two sets as mutually exclusive. 
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lineages to the mythopoeic worldview of the ancient Near East and the organicist perspective of 
the Greek philosophers.  
The contestations came from many different quarters: quantum mechanics shifted attention 
from distinct objects to mere connections, thus questioning the meaning of ‘objectivity’ and the 
separation of the observed from the observer; Gestalt psychoanalysis focused on the totalizing, 
irreducible nature of perception; and biology began to explore the concept of the biosphere, con-
templating our ability to understand the living world and its environment not only from the bot-
tom up, but also from the top down, as a complex system whose so-called ‘emergent’ properties 
transcend the sum of its components (for an overview and synthesis of these developments, see 
Capra 1996). 
One common result of this contestation was a growing emphasis on the cooperative under-
pinnings of living systems. In literature, novelists like Roman Gary in The Roots of Heaven (1958) 
and Frank Herbert in Dune (1965) pointed to the impact of humans on ecological transfor-
mations, while science fiction writers like Olaf Stapeldon contemplated the role of symbiosis 
in the future history of humanity (Last and First Men 1930) and in the evolution of consciousness 
more generally (Star Maker 1937). In the life sciences, biologists and chemists like Lynn Margu-
lis and James Lovelock made cooperation and symbiosis the linchpin of not only the interaction 
of distinct species, but also evolution itself, including the emergence of totally new species 
(Margulis 1967; Margulis and Sagan 1997), and the overall regulation of the planet’s ecology – 
the so-called Gaia Hypothesis (Lovelock 1972; Lovelock and Margulis 1974; Lovelock 2000). 
Even Darwin’s theory was grudgingly adapted to take cooperation into account through the 
concept of ‘inclusive fitness’ (Hamilton 1964b, 1964a). The forces of competition, command 
and violence, argued the new students of cooperation, might help keep or eliminate things that 
already exist; but, on their own, they cannot create something new. Genesis, they contended, can-
not be imposed solely by force and violence. It needs a ‘voluntary’ spark, and that spark, they 
posited, is most likely to be generated through cooperation and symbiosis (Margulis in Teresi 
2011).  
These considerations bear directly on the subject of this paper. To create order – or creorder 
– requires energy. But in and of itself, the mere capture of energy does not tell us much about the 
effectiveness of its conversion (its ability to create order), let alone the specific patterns it gives rise 
to (the nature of the resulting order). For these, we need to understand what physicist-philosopher 
David Bohm calls the generative order – in this case, the specific ‘algorithm’ that directs the use of 
energy. And this algorithm, it seems to us, depends crucially on the ways in which power and 
conflict interact with cooperation and symbiosis. 
 
6. Parochial Altruism 
  
6.1 The Birth of Human Societies 
 
The importance of this interaction for the evolution of prehistoric societies is examined by Choi, 
Bowles and Gintis in their sociobiological agent-based modelling of ‘parochial altruism’ (Choi 
and Bowles 2007; Bowles and Gintis 2011). Human beings, they point out, tend to be both altru-
istic (willing to benefit fellow group members at a cost to themselves) and parochial (hostile to-
ward individuals not of their own group). At first sight, this duality might seem puzzling, since, 
on their own, neither altruism nor parochialism offers the positive payoff necessary for survival. 
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But if we consider the two traits not separately but jointly, argue Choi, Bowles and Gintis, the 
puzzle disappears.  
The unique hallmark of parochial-altruist societies is that they both fuel war and benefit from 
its consequences: their outward bellicosity incites violent conflicts, while their inner cooperation 
helps them come out on top and reap the gains from those conflicts. Other sociobiological types 
– specifically tolerant altruists, parochial nonaltruists and tolerant nonaltruists – either do not 
incite violence or cannot benefit from it, or both. But parochial altruists can and do – and under 
specific genetic/societal/environmental conditions, say Choi and Bowles and Gintis, this dif-
ference can become evolutionarily crucial.  
Using various game-theoretical simulations, they show that in situations where (1) most al-
truistic individuals are also parochial and vice versa, (2) most parochial altruists live in groups 
dominated by parochial altruists and (3) the physical environment is harsh enough to imply a 
struggle over resources, parochial altruism displaces other modes of social organization to be-
come the norm. Such conditions, they then speculate, might have existed during the late Pleisto-
cene and early Holocene (7,000 years ago, or earlier) – and if that speculation is correct, it might 
explain how the spread of war boosted altruism and vice versa, and why human societies have 
become disposed toward both conflict and cooperation. 
 
6.2. The Rise of Complex Hierarchical Societies 
 
This insight is carried further by cliodynamists Anderson, Gavrilets and Turchin, who argue that 
parochial altruism might account for not only the co-emergence of social power and cooperation, 
but also the transition from prehistoric societies, which were small and simple, to historic societies, 
which are large and complex (Turchin and Gavrilets 2009; Gavrilets, Anderson, and Turchin 
2010; Turchin 2016). Since parochialism increases the group benefit from conquest while altruism 
makes such conquest possible, parochial altruism, they argue, has made human society war-
prone. And since war boosts internal group cohesion, catalyses technological and organizational 
innovations, and enables bigger societies to trump and take over smaller ones, the result has been 
to make societies bigger and bigger.  
On its own, though, this explanation is still insufficient. Larger societies, observe Anderson, 
Gavrilets and Turchin, are far more difficult to manage than smaller ones, so in order to continue 
and grow, they have had to change in two important respects. First, they have had to legitimize 
large-scale violence against other societies, which they have done by introducing broader symbolic 
markers to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’ (primarily by substituting religion, ethnicity, race and 
nationalism for the narrower markers of family and tribe). Second, they have had to facilitate 
inward coordination, which they have done by creating complex hierarchies – a social technology 
largely unknown to their prehistoric predecessors. 
 
6.3 The Mix and Orientation of Cooperation and Conflict 
 
All in all, then, parochial altruism offers an economic-biological theory of social evolution in 
which both the specific mix and respective orientation of cooperation and conflict change radically 
over time, and where both changes are closely connected to the conversion of energy. An advo-
cate of this theory might summarize its evolutionary implications as follows.  
In prehistoric societies, that advocate would argue, intergroup violence, measured in per cap-
ita casualties, was far more lethal than in historic societies (for ample evidence on this point, see 
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Pinker 2011; Diamond 2012; Gómez et al. 2016). But since prehistoric societies had limited food 
surpluses, their outward violence – however deadly – could consume no more than a small frac-
tion of their time and effort. By necessity, most of their energy had to be devoted to inward, life-
sustaining cooperation. In other words, in these early societies, the exercise of power and violence 
must have been mostly external and limited (in term of its energy requirements), while coopera-
tion was mostly internal and paramount.  
The emergence of food surpluses, which according to many mark the beginning of history, 
the theory’s advocate would continue, altered this equation. Societies – or rather their rulers – 
were now able to devote a sizeable and often increasing portion of their energy to war-making, 
and that ability changed both the intra- and inter-societal dynamics. First, food surpluses allowed 
the amount of energy devoted to power and violence to rise relative to that dedicated to cooper-
ation. Second, with more violent energy, the societal unit could begin to grow by conquering and 
taking over other social units. And third, the growth of the social unit – from families and tribes 
to chieftainships and eventually states – meant that power (and, if necessary, also violence) could 
now be projected not only outward, but also inward, through complex hierarchies, multiple 
threats and the organized use of physical force. So unlike in prehistoric societies, in historic soci-
eties, power – and the threat of violence that backs it up – is exercised not only externally, but 
also internally, and its claim on energy grows in importance relative to that of cooperation.18 
 
6.4 The Spoils of War 
 
With this understanding in mind, let us examine the framework of parochial altruism a bit more 
closely. As we see it, the evolutionary argument here rests crucially on the ‘spoils of war’: it is the 
                                                 
18 This stylized summary – and here we come back to our own perspective – merits an important qualifi-
cation. As stated here, the parochial-altruism thesis seems to imply that food surpluses inevitably lead to 
a hierarchical society. In practice, though, that has rarely been the case. Many small prehistoric societies 
enjoyed transitory surpluses and some developed agricultural techniques that could have allowed such 
surpluses to be produced regularly. Yet in most cases, these surpluses were never produced, simply aban-
doned or ritualistically destroyed. And why? Because in those societies food surpluses had no perceptible 
use and, if allowed to exist, would have threatened the very egalitarian underpinning of their culture 
(Mandel 1962: Vol. 1, Ch. 1). 
It seems that the systematic production of food surpluses took hold only in those societies where a 
rudimentary power hierarchy already existed (or had been imposed from the outside). Simple irrigation 
techniques, for example, were known outside of and prior to the rise of the delta civilizations, but with 
no one to impose them, they were seldom used to cultivate crops (Frankfort 1951: Ch. 2). According to 
Jared Diamond (1999: 23), ‘detailed archaeological studies have shown that complex irrigation systems 
did not accompany the rise of centralized bureaucracies, but followed after a considerable lag. That is, 
political centralization arose for some other reason and then permitted construction of complex irrigation 
systems’ (emphasis added). In the Near East, the rise of large-scale irrigation went hand in hand with the 
imposition of new crops, particularly wheat and barley. Unlike the diverse range of Neolithic plants that 
often require intense cultivation on small, independent plots, wheat and barley are highly suited for large-
scale hierarchical production: they are easy to standardize, relatively high in yield, fairly resilient and easy 
to store. That, in any event, is what we see in the first palatial hierarchies of the Fertile Crescent, where 
delta-irrigated wheat and barley made it possible for rulers to concentrate and control large multitudes of 
property-less peasants and slaves, build imperial armies, organize hierarchical religions, erect complex 
bureaucracies and develop exclusionary writing and arithmetic.  
All in all, then, we can argue that, in and of itself, surplus food – and rising energy capture per capita 
more generally – is a necessary but insufficient condition for hierarchical society. For such a society to 
emerge, the power drive must be there to begin with. This power drive has to enforce not only the very 
creation of surplus food and energy, but also its particular production techniques and specific end uses. 
Without this enforcement, the surplus would either not be produced at all or be directed for non-hierar-
chical ends. 
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spoils of war that supposedly explain the pre-historic co-emergence of social power and coopera-
tion, and it is the spoils of war that presumably account for the historic rise of large and complex 
hierarchical polities. But, then, who exactly gets these spoils, and what do the spoils consist of?  
Begin with the appropriators. In prehistoric societies, the triumphant group would normally 
take over or usurp the natural and social resources of the losing one, and given that prehistoric 
societies tended to be relatively flat, these resources would probably be distributed relatively 
equally. But in historic societies, the endgame can be very different. Since most if not all historic 
societies are hierarchical and therefore inherently unequal, the loot and tribute of war, both im-
mediately and over the longer term, are likely to be spread rather unevenly.  
And indeed, as far as historic societies are concerned, that is what the indirect data seem to 
suggest, particularly for early polities. According to Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2011), 
preindustrial societies with low per capita income (below $800 per annum in 1990 purchasing 
power parity) tended to push against what the authors call the ‘inequality possibility frontier’, 
meaning that the vast majority of their population was kept at or close to physical subsistence, 
leaving the remainder of the social produce (and war booty when available) to be appropriated 
mostly by their elites.19 These results suggest that, unlike in flat prehistoric societies, the underly-
ing populations of early hierarchical societies had relatively little or nothing to gain – and perhaps plenty 
to lose – from initiating war (defensive war is obviously different). And if that was indeed the case, 
it implies that the initial foray of small flat societies into violent hierarchical expansion must have 
been forced on the majority by a small minority (see footnote 18).  
The second, related question concerns the underlying motivation for war: do societies really 
fight over material ‘spoils’ – and if so, why? In prehistoric societies, the answer, again, seems 
obvious: under harsh environmental conditions, war booty could have spelt the difference be-
tween life and death, so fighting over it must have offered a significant evolutionary advantage. 
The situation in historic societies, though, is radically different. Since these societies produce sur-
plus food and therefore do not face the threat of biological annihilation, and given that most of 
their population stands to gain little and perhaps lose plenty from hostile expansionism, the drive 
for war must come primarily from their rulers. But then – and here we come to the crucial point 
– for the rulers, whether they acknowledge it or not, the spoils of war are almost always a means 
to an end rather than the end itself. Their ultimate purpose in going to war, we argue, is not the 
biological survival of society, let alone the rulers’ own, but the aggrandizement and expansion of their 
power for its own sake.  
 
6.5. From Agents to Structure: Dematerializing Parochial Altruism  
 
In our view, one of the key limitations of the parochial-altruism model – and of evolutionary 
game-theoretical modelling more generally – is the twin emphasis on individual actors and material 
gain (on the assumptions and implicatons of evolutionary game theory, see for example 
Varoufakis 2008; Adami, Schossau, and Hintze 2016). Note that these models are commonly 
                                                 
19 In the ancient empires such as Akkad and Rome, the underlying population of the imperial core seemed 
to have enjoyed a higher ‘standard of living’ than those of the periphery. This differential, though, can be 
very misleading, if only because most of the core’s population ended up there after losing its allodial lands 
to the imperial elites through confiscation and appropriation. In this context, the Roman ‘bread and cir-
cuses’ offered by the Cura Annonae (free grain supply) and various forms of entertainment were hardly the 
spoils of victory. If anything, they were the means of controlling and placating a disgruntled and volatile 
population, dispossessed, uprooted and proletarianized by the endless demands of imperial expansion 
(for a rich literary account of these processes, see McCullough 1990).  
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referred to as ‘agent-based’. Although often applied to pre-capitalist societies, their starting point 
is the basic atom of the liberal cosmos – the independent human agent. Propelled by their inner 
preferences and inclinations, these atoms are assumed to interact with each other spontaneously. 
Mediated through Newton’s attraction and repulsion reincarnated as Smith’s demand and sup-
ply, they truck and barter, cooperate and fight, procreate, kill and die; and it is these seemingly 
free-willed interactions, the model posits, that gradually weave the pattern of social evolution, 
giving rise to an emergent societal structure. The specific goals of the atoms can vary greatly, 
depending on the particular model, and they can be innate or acquired. But subservient to the 
Malthusian-Darwinian logic of the liberal world, they are all geared to serving one ultimate pur-
pose: survival. And since survival requires energy, the social atoms are completely obsessed with 
‘material payoff’. All they want is ‘stuff’ – things that either contain or can generate the energy 
they need to survive – and the rest is noise.20 
As we have already seen, though, when we move from prehistoric to historic societies – i.e., 
to polities that already generate surplus energy and whose biological survival as such is no longer 
at stake – the individualist-material rationale for conflict, violence and war becomes too restrictive 
and possibly misleading. But, then, since historic polities, just like their prehistoric predecessors, 
tend to be both externally bellicose and internally cooperative, it must be that somewhere along 
the line their parochial altruism was partly if not largely dematerialized.  
What are the theoretical implications of a dematerialized parochial-altruistic society? For 
one, we can no longer refer to its modelling as agent-based. And why not? Because to say that a 
model is based on agents is to imply that there is nothing prior to those agents: that they are the 
starting point, the source of all preferences, and therefore the prime mover of everything else. 
This, of course, is the liberal worldview. And as long as the agents’ autonomy is restricted to 
material payoff, their actions are by and large predictable and the model is normally soluble. 
However, when agents are no longer bounded by physical survival, their unbounded autonomy 
makes them unpredictable, and an agent-based system of unpredictable agents cannot be mod-
elled, by definition.  
Historically, this dilemma presented liberal modellers with two options: stick to the liberal 
ideal of autonomous atoms and rethink the way they should be modelled – or protect the existing 
model by sacrificing the very liberal ideal on which it rests. And judging by the current status of 
liberal modelling, most if not all have opted for the latter option: Aldus Huxley’s free-thinking 
‘savages’ and ‘Alpha Double-Plus’ clones were ceremonially discharged, replaced by pre-pro-
grammed ‘Deltas’ and ‘Epsilons’ who stick to the plot and do precisely what their modellers tell 
them to (Huxley 1932; Nitzan and Bichler 2002: 146).  
Now, ideology aside, there is little reason to contest this analytical arrest. After all, all living 
creatures, including liberal humanoids, are conditioned by their natural and social environment, 
so the notion that they are somehow wholly or even largely autonomous was always a bit of a 
stretch. But then – and here we come to the key point – if the modellers accept that humans are 
partly or largely predetermined, they should also recognize that their modelling is no longer agent-
based, but structure-based.  
Unfortunately, though, this recognition per se does not get the modellers off the hook. Not 
by a long shot. The problem is that, although action is now said to be dictated by the structure of 
                                                 
20 Evolutionary game theory often defines payoff more broadly as ‘evolutionary fitness’. But since evolu-
tionary fitness means the ability to survive and procreate, and given that this ability hinges on the capture 
and conversion of energy, in the end the payoff must be ‘materialized’. 
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the model rather than the free will of its agents, that action is no longer motivated solely by phys-
ical survival. As noted, some of it – and often much of it – is driven by power for the sake of power, 
and this new emphasis can make the model unstable, indeterminate and even insoluble.  
In the economic-biological approach, agents are conditioned to maximize their material gain, 
subject to the ‘rules of the game’ (which, as far as the agents are concerned, are fixed or at least 
independent of their own actions). In a world driven by power, however, that is no longer the 
case. Here, the acting units – be they human beings, formal organizations or looser institutions – 
are propelled, at least in part, to alter the rules themselves. They are conditioned not only to increase 
their material payoff within a given structure, but also – and often primarily – to creorder that 
very structure. And if the main driving force is to creorder society, the game-theoretical frame-
work – whether we call it actor- or structure-based – breaks down. Instead of operating in a New-
tonian universe whose particles are contained in a prefixed space with a given set of rules, we find 
ourselves in a Leibnitzian cosmos whose particles are driven to bend and creorder the very logic 
of the space they constitute (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: cf. 279-282).21  
  
6.6 Taking Stock and Looking Ahead  
 
To recap, our argument thus far has been that, although power hierarchies are pursued for their 
own sake, social organization can never be entirely hierarchical. It always involves – and must 
involve – some autonomous cooperation. Indeed, it is perhaps not far-fetched to suggest that this 
duality – i.e., the quest for power and the necessity of cooperation – lies at the very root of social 
evolution. The problem, though, is that the cutting-edge models that seek to explain this process 
– particularly those based of parochial altruism – are too restrictive. They might help explain 
social evolution when power is mostly a means to material ends, but they become unstable and 
possibly insoluble when power is sought for its own sake. 
And as we shall see below, the difficulty goes even deeper. First, power for the sake of power 
tends to undermine autonomous cooperation, particularly on a large scale and certainly as a guid-
ing principle. As a consequence, autonomously cooperative organizations are few and far be-
tween, which means that there is no meaningful benchmark against which to assess the relative 
ability of hierarchy to capture and convert energy and therefore the claim that hierarchical insti-
tutions emerge and persist because of their superior energy capture. Second, hierarchical societies 
use a significant portion of their energy merely to erect and maintain their hierarchies, which in 
turn means that much of their headline growth is dedicated not to wellbeing, but to augmenting 
and defending power as such. Sections 7 and 8 address these issues in turn. 
 
  
                                                 
21 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004: 234) consider the first step in this quantum leap, namely the pos-
sibility that changes in structure might alter action: ‘[I]magine a model in which preferences and beliefs 
(moral and otherwise) are simultaneous by-products of some social process rooted in the development of 
organised production [. . .]. These theoretical moves will threaten to dissolve the distinction between action 
and structure which lies at the heart of the game theoretical depiction of social life because it will mean that 
the structure begins to supply reasons for action and not just constraints upon action’. This depiction, though, 
stops short of what, in our view, is the ultimate trap: a model whose actors are not only affected by its evolving 
structure, but are driven to actively alter it.  
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7. Are Hierarchies Better at Capturing Energy?  
 
7.1 Subjugating Energy to Power 
 
If hierarchy were merely a means of capturing/converting energy, its ubiquity might lead one to 
believe it must be the most effective way of doing so. But if hierarchical power is not – or at least 
not principally – a means to an end but the end itself, energy capture becomes a subsidiary goal, 
if at all. And if that is indeed the case, the link between hierarchy and the conversion of energy 
becomes more complicated and difficult to assess. 
To illustrate, assume that the goal of power overrides that of energy capture in only a few 
polities or in a small number of organizations within those polities. In this case, the relatively low 
energy capture of these polities/organizations might make them easy prey to other, less dogmatic 
and therefore more effective energy capturers, and this relative inferiority could in turn cause 
them to be defeated, be taken over and disappear. But if power for the sake of power is universal 
across and within all polities – meaning that energy capture is by and large subservient to the 
inherent quest for power – then there is no longer a necessity for polities and organizations to capture as 
much energy as they can. In this context, power-driven entities are akin to the scorpion who asks 
the frog to carry it over a pond, stings its carrier halfway through and then defends its self-defeat-
ing act by saying ‘It’s in my nature’. Just like the scorpion, power-driven entities simply ‘cannot 
help it’: they have to pursue power for its own sake even if that pursuit causes their energy capture 
to linger. And if all entities are conditioned in this way, the net result is for their entire differential 
pecking order to downshift to a lower average level of energy capture.  
This outcome is not as farfetched as it may sound. One of the basic premises of strategic 
sabotage is the idea that, in order to impose power, one has to undermine societal efficiency, and 
although societal efficiency is not the same as energy capture, the underlying rationale is not very 
different and useful to consider. According to the path-breaking work of Stephen Marglin (1974), 
rulers have consistently and routinely undermined the efficiency of their subjects: when the Ro-
mans rammed slaves into brick and pottery ‘factories’, when European feudal lords imposed wa-
ter mills and prohibited hand mills, when post-bellum American planters forced a credit-based 
system of sharecropping on small farmers and when Stalin collectivized Soviet agriculture – the 
purpose, argues Marglin, was to make their subjects easier to rule, even at the cost of lower effi-
ciency. And the same argument holds for the emergence of capitalist production: British capital-
ists, says Marglin, retained demonstrably inefficient mining techniques, introduced the factory 
system well before the arrival of machines and insisted on a minute division of labour that was 
debilitating to the point of becoming technically counterproductive, particularly in comparison 
to the efficient labour cooperatives they sought to dismantle (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 233). Fi-
nally and discouragingly, as the long menu of sabotage-fuelled differential returns in Section 2.1 
clearly demonstrates, things haven’t changed much since then.  
 Societal efficiency and energy capture need not go hand in hand (the growth of waste, for 
example, can lower the former while raising the latter). But the very existence of societal ineffi-
ciencies, particularly if they are built into the logic of power, suggests that society’s capacity to 
capture/convert energy is rarely if ever put to full use. Now, since power in capitalism is gauged 
not by the differential capture of energy, but by differential profit and capitalization, and given 
that differential profit and capitalization hinge on various forms of strategic sabotage, we end up 
with a hierarchical order of entities whose relative power is conditioned, at least in part, on their 
differential ability to incapacitate. 
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The problem with this claim, though, is that, in capitalism, much of this under-capacity uti-
lization – whether measured in output or energy – does not show up in the official statistics. And 
why not? Because capitalist measures of capacity utilization – which typically fluctuate between 
70 and 90 per cent – are benchmarked not against some absolute maximum, but relative to the 
(much lower) level that capitalists consider optimal in terms of profit. Thorstein Veblen, one of the 
first writers to point out this built-in discrepancy, claimed that if we were to compare output not 
to the capitalist maximum, but to the ‘technological’ one, utilization rates would stand at 25 per 
cent (1919: 81). Indeed, in some sectors, such as military production, this rate has been recently 
estimated at a mere 10 per cent (U.S. Congress 1991: 38). 
 
7.2 Telling Examples 
 
So why not abandon the artificially low capitalist measures and instead estimate the actual capac-
ity capped by available technology? The reason is that, when it comes to society as a whole, this 
actual capacity might be unknowable. Since the ability of a society to capture energy depends on 
the way it is organized, the only way to determine its maximum capture rate (read ‘capacity’) is 
to rank energy capture levels across the entire spectrum of possible organizational types – from 
the most hierarchical forms of command to the most autonomous forms cooperation – and use 
the highest capture rate as our benchmark. This comparison, though, is difficult if not impossible 
to conduct, particularly on a large enough scale. And why? Because when institutions and polities 
are driven by power for the sake of power, they tend to systematically discourage, prevent and 
disable cooperative initiatives – especially if they are autonomous, doubly so if they are big, and 
most definitely so if they are successful.22 And since this systematic exclusion makes flat cooper-
ative organizations and polities few and far between and truly autonomous ones non-existent, we 
end up with no basis for comparison.23 
But there are still telling examples. Drawing on Knorr-Cetina (1999), Ulf Martin (2016: 39) 
brings up the case of CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research. CERN operates 
the world’s largest particle physics laboratory – one of the most powerful energy converters ever 
created. Its complexity is mindboggling: it constitutes a collaboration of numerous states; its fa-
cilities are used by hundreds of institutions; it has over 13,000 people on site; and its staff is com-
prised of thousands of scientists and over 10,000 visiting experts. And, yet, despite its record en-
ergy capture and high complexity, the CERN organization is remarkably flat. The participating 
scientists are often top experts in their field, so there is little room for ‘command’ to begin with 
(who could tell them what to do?). Moreover, their very activity – from theorizing, to experiment 
design, to implementation and conclusions – is inherently cooperative, so even the impulse to 
                                                 
22 Witness the fate of the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Founded during Roosevelt’s ‘First One 
Hundred Days’ in 1933, the TVA operated in seven states to provide electric power, flood control and 
water conservation, as well as to rebuild eroded soil and produce fertilizers. The initiative was highly 
efficient, both technically and economically, and boasted a huge energy capture – its energy output per 
capita was twice the U.S. average, and it was produced at half the national cost. The problem, though, 
was that the TVA was highly democratic and involved extensive grassroots autonomy. The demonstrated 
effectiveness of this flat model of cooperative planning threatened the underpinnings of private capitalized 
power, and that threat pretty much ascertained that the United States would never engage in a similar 
experiment again (Baran and Sweezy 1966: 165-167). 
23 We should note here that the problem concerns not only the measurement of efficiency and capacity, but 
also their very definitions (see footnote 7). Autonomous communities, attuned to the wellbeing of their 
members, are likely to conceive of these notions very differently and perhaps inversely from the way they 
are perceived in contemporary capitalist states, whose yardsticks are geared not toward the livelihood of 
their subjects, but toward the power interests of their rulers (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 225-226). 
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command is weak (many CERN papers are co-published by everyone involved, which often 
makes the list of contributors longer than the articles themselves . . .). 
Now, on the face of it, the ability to coordinate highly complex large-scale operations through 
flat, voluntary cooperation might seem to contradict the limits imposed by Dunbar’s number 
(Section 3.1). In human societies, though, this limit might be less firm than in animal ones. First, 
even if the biological cap on personal connections means that, beyond a certain scale, the size of 
human society can grow only by connecting groups rather than individuals, the connections be-
tween those groups need not be hierarchical. Second, although humans, like other animals, might 
be incapable of personally interacting with more than a limited number of their peers, unlike other 
animals (or so we think), there is practically no limit to their impersonal interaction. Their open-
ended imagination, symbolic systems, record keeping and long-range (and nowadays instant) 
communication make it possible for them to form associations and collectives whose scope is no 
longer restricted by the size of their neocortex.  
In his novels The Elementary Particles (2000) and The Possibility of an Island (2005), Michel 
Houellebecq conceives a hologramic alternative to the discrete materialism of human biology. 
Inspired by Alain Aspect’s 1982 experiment in which distant subatomic particles were shown to 
be ‘inseparable’, he envisages a future in which human beings are genetically engineered to be 
entangled with rather than separate from each other. But, then, is this capacity to be entangled 
with rather than bounce off each other not here already? As Ulf Martin points out, given that the 
most technically complex activities such as CERN’s can be coordinated with limited hierarchy 
and in a relatively power-free way, why can the very same thing not be done with technically 
simpler and far less complicated tasks?  
Hierarchies, then, are not necessarily the most effective way to convert energy. Although the 
evidence here is by no means ample, the little that does exist suggests that, when allowed to op-
erate autonomously, flat coordination can be equally if not more effectual. This tentative conclu-
sion, thought, brings us right back to where we started: if hierarchies are not built in order to 
bolster the capture of energy in the first place, and if they are not necessarily the most effective 
way of doing so anyway, why does energy capture per capita correlate with hierarchical struc-
tures? 
  
8. Energy for Hierarchy 
 
To answer this question, we need to examine the purpose for which the energy is used. From a 
bio-physical perspective, that purpose is irrelevant. Once ‘captured’, a joule of energy is just like 
any other, regardless of the work it ends up doing or how much of it dissipates as waste. But if 
we are to decipher the connection between energy capture and social hierarchy, the purpose of 
energy is crucial, particularly in hierarchical societies. And why? Because in hierarchical societies 
a good chunk of the captured energy is earmarked not for material gain, livelihood and wellbeing, 
but for sustaining and fortifying the hierarchical structure itself. Moreover, and as we shall see below, 
the split between the portions going to hierarchy and livelihood is never fixed. In fact, it is bound 
to vary, both across societies and over time, and this variability means that, in practice, there is no 
one-to-one mapping between the overall energy capture of society and the ‘livelihood’ of its pop-
ulation: for any given level of energy capture, there can be a whole range of ‘standards of living’.  
These observations have important implications, to which we return in Section 9. Before 
doing so, though, we need to ask why? Why does the build-up and maintenance of power hierar-
chies require energy in the first place? The short answer, which we unzip below, is that power 
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hierarchies elicit resistance that has to be contained and generate complexities that need to be 
maintained, and this ‘containing and maintaining’ requires plenty of energy.  
 
8.1 Resistance 
  
As noted, a mode of power is a social order driven by power for the sake of power. The quest for 
power, though, is deeply dialectical: it implies its own negation and therefore can exist only 
against opposition and resistance. This resistance, we argue, takes two forms: power-replacing and 
power-negating. The first form is internal to the power struggle itself, and it arises because attempts 
by one entity to impose power are almost always opposed by other entities that strive to impose 
this very power. In capitalism, for example, governments, corporations, labour unions, religious 
apparatuses, criminal networks and other such organizations constantly contest each other’s 
power, and this ongoing contestation means that power always faces resistance. The same prin-
ciple, though with different contenders, applies to other modes of power – from ancient city-states 
and empires, to feudalism, oriental despotism and state communism. 
The second type of resistance is external to the power struggle proper. It originates not from 
a quest for power, but from its very negation – namely, the desire to undo hierarchy altogether in 
favour of autonomy and cooperation. This latter drive is often latent, buried under the dead 
weight of hierarchical power, but it is always there – for if it were not, there would be nothing to 
rule over and no need for power to start with.  
Power is imposed mostly through organizational and institutional hierarchies, and since the 
quest for power is ever present, so is the drive to create and extend its hierarchies. Now, since 
hierarchical power is constantly opposed and resisted from within and without, its imposition 
requires ongoing strategic sabotage: new contenders to power are always lurking and need be 
eliminated or at least undermined and contained, while those who are to be dominated have to 
be persuaded, tempted and forced into submission. And these activities – and here we come to 
the key point – consume a significant portion of society’s energy. They imply standing armies, orga-
nized religion, a legal system, various bureaucracies, police forces, ongoing propaganda and other 
such dedicated institutions, as well as numerous dual-purpose activities that physically sustain 
society as well as maintain and augment its hierarchical order.  
 
8.2 Complexity 
 
Moreover, and importantly, the build-up of power hierarchies tends to feed on itself in an ‘auto-
catalytic sprawl’ (Martin 2016). The stronger the imposed power and its associated sabotage, the 
greater the resistance to it, and therefore the greater the need to contain and overcome that re-
sistance with even more hierarchies and additional sabotage. The net result of this autocatalytic 
sprawl is to make power-driven societies appear increasingly ‘complex’.  
Most students of complexity, though, do not accept this derivation. Following the biological-
economic perspective, they tend to think about social ‘complexity’ positively rather than nega-
tively, as an inevitable aspect of social scale as such. Tainter (1988, 2000), for instance, suggests 
that the larger the society and the greater its use of energy, the harder it is to coordinate; that the 
greater the coordination problems, the more difficult and involved their solutions; and that while 
the solutions may provide local, short-term fixes, over the longer run they tend to make society 
even more complex, thus creating further problems in need of new solutions and therefore even 
greater complexity.  
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In our opinion, though, this positive reasoning can be highly misleading. It seems to us that 
part – and possibly a significant part – of the complexity of power-driven societies stems not from 
trying to boost efficiency, but from trying to control it – and if need be, undermine it – for power 
ends. And if our hypothesis here is correct – and at this point it is admittedly just a hypothesis – 
then social complexity should be examined less as a ‘problem-solving strategy’, as Tainter calls 
it, and more as a built-in lever of sabotage, a negative feature inherent in any self-propagating 
mode of power.  
Most power-driven complexities, we propose, are unintended, emerging from the confluence 
of otherwise separate forms of strategic sabotage. Take the early twentieth-century destruction of 
urban public transportation in the United States, undertaken by the country’s major oil and auto-
mobile companies (Barnet 1980: Ch. 2). On its own, this destruction represented a run-of-the-mill 
attempt by a corporate coalition to augment its differential profit through strategic sabotage. We 
can say the very same thing about numerous other attempts, including the substitution of the 
internal-combustion engine for electric cars, the subsidized construction of the highway system 
and the mortgaging of middle-class Americans into debt servitude. Each of these processes was 
promoted by and served the power interests of a particular alliance of corporations and investors. 
For our purpose here, though, the interesting thing to note is their combined consequence – which, 
in this case, was the emergence of a highly complex suburban sprawl whose ecological destruc-
tiveness goes hand in hand with its massive energy capture. Nobody masterminded this destruc-
tive energy sprawl – and there was no need to. When various acts of sabotage converge, particu-
larly on a large enough scale, the growth of energy-sucking complexity is all but inevitable.  
Or consider the growing global centralization and politicization of the food, medical and 
leisure sectors. Over the past half-century, the intersection of these processes culminated in the 
imposition of a cheap junk-food diet, massive overmedication and the progressive sedation of the 
population through passive entertainment and physical inaction (Bichler and Nitzan 2016a). The 
net result of these otherwise separate forms of strategic sabotage is a worldwide epidemic of obe-
sity, diabetes, heart disease and mental illness – which has in turn given rise to a sprawling, en-
ergy-guzzling complex of social, health and legal hierarchies, all dedicated to . . . ‘solving the 
problem’. Here too, the resulting complexity has been largely unintended, but given that this 
complexity originated and continues to be perpetrated in support of hierarchical power, most of 
the energy it absorbs ends up going not to livelihood and wellbeing, but to strategic sabotage, by 
definition. 
Finally, while most power-driven complexity is probably unintended, some of it is clearly 
premeditated. Much of the barrier-laden design of computer hardware and communication net-
works, for example, is deliberately complex – as are the Kafkaesque aspects of the legal system 
and the intricate and often impenetrable maze of modern accounting and finance. The energy 
captured by this intentional complexity adds little to wellbeing and livelihood and plenty to hier-
archical power.  
 
9. Toward an Alternative Model 
 
9.1 Overview 
 
With most of the pieces now in place, we can begin to model, however tentatively, the relation-
ship between energy and hierarchy, the ways in which this relationship might evolve in different 
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modes of power and the implication of this evolution for the capitalist mode of power more spe-
cifically. The following five points, outlined visually in Figure 4, highlight the basic premises on 
which we build our model. 
 
Figure 4: From Hierarchical Organizations to Energy Capture 
 
 
1. Human society is an evolving creorder driven by a dialectical clash between imposed power 
and autonomous cooperation. A mode of power is characterized by the manner and extent 
to which autonomous cooperation conflicts with and is subordinated to power.  
 
2. Power relations are partly organized through the imposition of hierarchically nested institu-
tions and organizations.  
 
3. The imposition of hierarchies elicits opposition and therefore requires strategic sabotage, 
which in turn calls for the exertion of more power through greater sabotage and additional 
hierarchies. The result of this process is an autocatalytic sprawl, with hierarchies becoming 
more numerous, taller and increasingly complex.  
 
4. Since the exertion of hierarchical power against opposition necessitates strategic sabotage, 
and because sabotage requires energy to be carried out, hierarchical structures, regardless of 
their specific purpose, consume energy. Everything else being the same, the more hierarchical 
the institution or organization, the greater the energy needed simply to erect and sustain it. 
Consequently, the size and height of hierarchical institutions are capped by their ability to 
capture energy.  
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5. One thing that differentiates capitalism from other modes of power is its ability to capture 
much more energy and therefore create far larger and taller hierarchies, hence the correlation 
between overall energy capture per capita and hierarchy. The pace of this process, though, is 
not necessarily dependent on hierarchies being more effective energy capturers than other 
modes of coordination. 
 
9.2 Hierarchical Energy, Livelihood Energy 
 
Our starting point in modelling the relationship between energy conversion and hierarchy for-
mation is to split the total energy captured/converted by society into two distinct flows: (1) hier-
archical energy that serves to impose, sustain and augment hierarchical power, and (2) livelihood 
energy that provides for subsistence and wellbeing. Now, while the total level of captured energy 
might be objectively given (at least in principle), its bifurcation into ‘hierarchical’ and ‘livelihood’ 
flows is not. As it turns out, this division is bound to be coloured by our political, ideological and 
theoretical disposition, and that bias is sure to affect the way we analyse and measure the two 
flows. So before turning to the actual model, it is important to examine this split more closely and 
put it in some context.  
To see the difficulty, consider the energy spent on standing armies, organized religion, the 
legal system, various bureaucracies, police forces, the management of propaganda and the vari-
ous forms of oppressive, suppressive and violent material technologies. On the face of it, these 
institutions and organizations seem pretty much dedicated to supporting hierarchy – but are they? 
Is all of that energy indeed earmarked for that purpose, or only part of it? And if only part of the 
energy goes to hierarchy, how do we know the proportion? And that is just for starters. In princi-
ple, we can say that every institution and organization serves hierarchical power to some extent, 
which, analytically, means that part of the energy it consumes – ranging anywhere from 0 to 100 
per cent of the total – goes to that end. But how do we quantify this portion? Or take the energy 
consumed by social complexity as such. What part of this energy should be traced back to the 
strategic sabotage that made society more complex in the first place, and what part is in fact nec-
essary for providing subsistence and wellbeing? And if these questions are not difficult enough, 
consider this one: what do we do when a given flow of energy serves both hierarchy and livelihood 
at the same time? How do we decide what part goes to what end? 
These questions are by no means unique to our specific bifurcation here. Although usually 
swept under the empirical carpet, they plague many of the basic divisions in political economy – 
including, among others, the distinctions between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour, ‘spec-
ulation’ and ‘investment’, ‘waste’ and ‘useful’ output, and ‘utility’ and ‘disutility’, as well the 
attribution of specific outputs to specific inputs in so-called joint production processes (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2009: Chs. 5-8).  
In fact, the problem is hardly limited to political economy as such. It pops up in any attempt 
to order the world, particularly when the ordering requires that we assign a ‘cause’, identify 
‘force’, or attribute ‘determination’ (Bunge 1961, 1979). Note that in order to distinguish liveli-
hood from hierarchical energy, we must first figure out what causes energy capture to increase or 
decrease, what forces society to be more or less hierarchical and what determines the flow of energy 
to livelihood as opposed to hierarchy. And since the answers to these questions cannot be entirely 
objective, neither can the quantitative split they give rise to.  
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9.3 Quantifying Quality: An Interpolation 
 
To order the world we must first categorize its qualities, and as the qualitative categories multiply, 
we soon find ourselves trying to quantify them. This quantification of qualities is always Protag-
orean. It is mediated through our senses, emotions and consciousness – in other words, through 
our discretion – and this discretion means that the result can never be entirely objective (i.e., 
external to and independent of our perception and cognition). For the purpose of our model here, 
then, the key issue is not that qualities are being transformed into quantities and that this trans-
formation cannot be universally given; we take this limitation as inherent. The interesting ques-
tions, rather, are, first, how this Protagorean transformation is made to look universal, who en-
forces this apparent universality and to what ends; and second, whether we can bypass this en-
forcement, however tentatively, to yield some general insights. 
In early civilizations, the quantification of qualities was often associated with the imposition 
of power – including the ranking of deities, the measuring of wealth, the parcelling of land, the 
pricing of violence and the costing of protection, among other inflictions. One of the first written 
records of such quantification comes from a broken Sumerian clay tablet, written some four mil-
lennia ago. The tablet lists various offenses, assigning to each of them a specific pecuniary penalty: 
 
If a man has cut off with an . . . –instrument the foot of another man whose . . . ., he 
shall pay 10 shekels of silver. If a man has severed with a weapon the bones of another 
man whose . . . ., he shall pay 1 mina of silver. If a man has cut off with a geshpu-instru-
ment, the nose of another man, he shall pay 2/3 of a mina of silver. (Kramer 1963: 84-
85; missing parts in the original) 
 
In giving acts of violence a price, the Sumerians effectively quantified their qualities, making 
them commensurate with every other priced violence – and, indeed, with every priced quality more 
generally. The early penal quantifiers probably sanctified their decrees to make them look heter-
onomous and hence unassailable, but in the end, they were their own arbitrary doing.24 And this 
arbitrary aspect, we posit, remains present, however imperceptibly, in every quantification of 
qualities ever since.  
Now, throughout much of history, the quantification of power was imposed from above, dic-
tated, vetted, consecrated and regulated by the gods through their earthly representatives – the 
rulers. For nearly five thousand years, this was the only way in which historic societies engaged 
with the world around them. There was one exception, though: the Greek poleis. Unlike the then-
dominant mythopoeic worldview in which subject and object were deeply intertwined and where 
worldly outcomes were often conjured up jointly by human agency and divine intervention, the 
Greek philosophers painted a stricter separation. They separated the physical world from both 
gods and humans, and what enabled them to conceive of and affect this separation was the radi-
cally different structure of their society.25  
                                                 
24 The key role of heteronomy in the evolution of societies is developed in the writings of Cornelius Cas-
toriadis. 
25 The emancipation of thought from myth and the associated separation of subject from object are ex-
plored in Frankfort and Groenewegen-Frankfort (1946). According to Kramer (1948), though, the mytho-
poeic thesis – and, by extension, the notion that the Greeks were the first to separate subject from object – is 
overstated and possibly wrong.  
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Whereas other civilizations were organized as power hierarchies, the Greeks creordered a 
demos-kratia – the first historic polity introspected, articulated and ruled directly by its own mem-
bers – and this flat, self-organized society allowed its philosophers to envisage a cosmos inde-
pendent of divine rulers and sanctified deities.26 This independent cosmos emerged with Thales, 
who searched for the common denominator, the primordial substance that everything in the 
world is made of. It continued with Democritus, who argued that all matter – which our senses 
perceive as a kaleidoscope of different qualities – in fact comprises various rearrangement of the 
same set of eternal atoms. And it was further propelled by Pythagoras, who went on to portray 
the world as a quantitative totality in which everything relates to everything else as ratios of two 
integers, or rational numbers. For the Greeks, these quality-to-quantity conversions existed ‘out 
there’. They depended neither on the will of the gods nor on the blessings of priests and kings. 
They were universal.  
But it was only with the liberal-scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries that the quantification of qualities was formally and thoroughly depoliticized – or so it 
seemed. Whereas the Greeks articulated the cosmos in the abstract, the new scientists went on to 
systematically measure it. Furthermore, they insisted on doing so recursively, quantifying nature 
in its ‘own natural units’, so to speak. Thus, the standard metre was defined as a fixed fraction of 
the planet’s circumference, the kilogram anchored to a given volume of water, the second related 
to the sun’s movement, the ampere benchmarked to Newton’s gravitation force, the kelvin linked 
to the volume of mercury and so on. Moreover, categories as such were placed on a scale – rang-
ing from the ‘nominal’, to the ‘ordinal’ to the ‘cardinal’ – giving the impression that shifting from 
one to the other was somehow a mere technicality. Even uncertainty and errors were given an 
objective shape, delineated by probability and statistics. Put together, these advances made the 
laws of the universe look eternal, liberated from the menace of political intervention, religious 
sorcery and plain human irrationality – or as Newton famously called it, ‘the folly of men’.27  
 
9.4 The Units of Political Economy 
 
Political economists – the first scientists of society – were part and parcel of this process. On the 
one hand, the emergence of capitalism with its physical machines, mechanized social structures 
and rapidly spreading price system, offered ‘natural philosophers’ ample metaphors for conceiv-
ing of and visualizing the physical cosmos. On the other hand, the new scientists of society were 
all too eager to imitate the objective measures devised by physicists, chemists and biologists (Bich-
ler and Nitzan 2012a). Spirited by these new winds of scientific progress, Jeremy Bentham, the 
first scientist of pleasure, created the elementary particle of liberalism – which he called ‘felicity’ 
                                                 
26 The role of human autonomy in the evolution of Greek philosophy and science is examined in Farrington 
(1969). The Greek demos-kratia is often criticized for excluding women, foreigners and slaves. This exclu-
sion, though, was premised on the notion that the excluded were not part of the demos in the first place 
and therefore has no bearing on the principle of direct democracy as such. Indeed, considering the despotic 
context in which the Greek experiment emerged (think of Persia and Egypt circa 500 BCE), its democ-
racy, although covering only part of the population, probably ranks as the most radical socio-conceptual 
revolution ever.  
27 Of course, invisible to most practicing scientists, Protagoras is still very much with them, hiding in their 
human-made mechanical apparatuses, crawling in the theories they use to translate and interpret the sig-
nals of those apparatuses and popping up in the occasional scientific revolution to help them objectively 
discard what they previously considered objectively given (as happened in the refutations of the luminif-
erous ether, the stationary universe, numerous atomic models, spontaneous generation, vitalism, caloric 
theory, etc.). 
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(later renamed ‘util’ by Irving Fisher). All human motivation, he argued, could be reduced to 
universal quantities of pleasure and pain, and this reduction, his fellow economists have since 
come to believe, allows us to denominate all economic activity in universal units of ‘wellbeing’ 
and then use these units to discover the self-equilibrating laws of liberal (read natural) society. 
Marx rejected this universalism. Historic societies in general and capitalism in particular, he 
claimed, are driven not by mutually beneficial interactions among individuals, but by the clash of 
conflicted classes. This conflictual setting – which in capitalism pits those who own the means of 
production against those who work them – requires a totally different elementary particle. And 
since, according to Marx, the root of the conflict lies in the sphere of production, the key unit of 
political economy should be based on labour – the ‘socially necessary abstract labour time’, or 
SNALT, that ‘productive workers’ must spend, on average, to produce a given bundle of com-
modities.  
As we have shown in our own work, though, the problem with these supposedly objective 
measures is that they are not objective in the least (Nitzan 1989; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Chs. 
5-8). Simply put, utils and SNALT cannot be measured, even in principle. Moreover, the very 
idea that a conflictual society can be understood with a single universal measure is an invitation 
for trouble. We agree with Hegel and Marx that society develops dialectically, evolving out of its 
inner contradictions. But this dialectical evolution, by its very nature, involves both conflict and 
cooperation, and those two dimensions, we posit, cannot be expressed in a single language 
(Nitzan 1998: 196; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 19-21; 220-221). While the underlying population 
experiences the world mostly through the absolute categories of livelihood, the rulers view it 
through the differential lens of power. And since the absolute and differential viewpoints are fun-
damentally different and often incommensurate, it is hard to see how they can be brought to a 
common denominator, let alone a quantitative one. To understand them, we need not one lan-
guage, but two: a conflictual language for power and hierarchy, and a cooperative one for sub-
sistence and livelihood.  
 
9.5 Back to Energy and Hierarchy 
 
As we shall see below, although energy flows to both livelihood and hierarchies, the effect it has 
on these two processes is so different that ‘more livelihood’ does not necessarily mean ‘less hier-
archy’, and vice versa. Moreover, although the two flows originate from the same source, the split 
between them depends, at least in part, on whether we take the viewpoint of the rulers or the 
ruled. As noted, these indeterminacies haunt any and every quantification of qualities. The dif-
ference here, though, is that, unlike the liberal and Marxist quantifications, ours explicitly recog-
nizes its own limitations and is therefore less likely – or so we hope – to fall prey to the ‘reality 
principle’ that Freud articulated and Marcuse so eloquently critiqued.  
‘In its refusal to accept as final the limitations imposed upon freedom and happiness by the 
reality principle’, writes Marcuse, ‘lies the critical function of phantasy’ (1955: 149). ‘Without 
phantasy’, he posits, ‘all philosophical knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past 
and severed from the future, which is the only link between philosophy and the real history of 
mankind’ (1968: 114). Following Marcuse’s lead, we shall show that, although the quantification 
of livelihood and hierarchical energies is always arbitrary to some extent, this arbitrariness can be 
partly sidestepped. By using our imagination – or fantasy, as Marcuse calls it – we can draw the 
overall boundaries of the two energy flows, examine their possible historical trajectories and ex-
plain why the CasP puzzle of growth in the midst of sabotage is in fact no puzzle at all.  
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10. Hierarchy-Energy Space and Hierarchy-Energy Curves 
  
Begin with a generic mode of power defined by the following concepts. Unless indicated other-
wise, the remainder of the paper uses ‘energy’ as a shorthand for energy capture, as defined in 
Section 1. 
 
GJ gigajoule (1 billion joules) 
𝐸 total energy per capita = 𝐻𝐸 + 𝐿𝐸 (GJ/year) 
𝐻𝐸 hierarchical energy per capita (GJ/year) 
𝐿𝐸 livelihood energy per capita (GJ/year) 
𝐻 share of hierarchical energy in total energy = 𝐻𝐸/𝐸 (decimal) 
hes hierarchy-energy space containing all (𝐻, 𝐸) combinations 
hec hierarchy-energy curve containing all (𝐻, 𝐸) combinations for a given 𝐿𝐸 
 
The total annual energy per capita converted by this hypothetical mode of power is 𝐸. This 
total comprises two sub-flows: hierarchical energy per capita 𝐻𝐸 and livelihood energy per capita 
𝐿𝐸, such that 𝐻𝐸 + 𝐿𝐸 = 𝐸. The relative share of hierarchical energy in total energy is given by 
𝐻.  
Before putting these concepts to use, two clarifications are in order. First, as noted in Sec-
tion 9, the particular division between hierarchical and livelihood energy is subjective to some 
extent, so the absolute magnitudes of 𝐻𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸 will depend on the viewpoint of the observer. 
Our analysis, though, is concerned not with absolute magnitudes, but with general trajectories, 
and as we shall later see, as long as the observers’ viewpoints remain fixed, our results hold for 
all observers. 
Second, our distinction between hierarchical energy per capita 𝐻𝐸 and livelihood energy per 
capita 𝐿𝐸 refers not to how the energy is produced, but to the manner in which it is consumed. 
Thus, both flows can be generated by hierarchical and/or flat organizations (or some combina-
tion of the two), and thermodynamically, both can be produced efficiently or inefficiently (relative 
to available knowledge). These differences do not matter for our distinction here. The only thing 
that counts is the purpose for which the energy is used: 𝐻𝐸 is used to impose hierarchical power, 
while 𝐿𝐸 is used to provide subsistence and wellbeing. Having said that, note that there is no 
presumption that the energy is efficiently utilized: as it stands, a given amount of hierarchical or 
livelihood energy can give rise to various levels of both hierarchy and livelihood, depending on 
the social effectiveness of its application.  
With these clarifications in mind, the relationship between total energy per capita 𝐸 and the 
fraction of hierarchical energy 𝐻 is given by Equation 2: 
 
2. 𝐻 =  
𝐸−𝐿𝐸
𝐸
 
 
Equations 2 is bounded, such that 0 ≤ 𝐻 < 1. Graphically, the relationship between 𝐻 and 
𝐸 traces what we call a hierarchy-energy curve, or hec, which is in turn plotted on a hierarchy-energy 
space, or hes. We call it a ‘space’ since it relates three variables: 𝐻, 𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸.  
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10.1 The Hierarchy-Energy Curve 
 
Figure 5 shows the hes with three different hecs. The hes is bounded from three sides – bottom, left 
and top – and is open-ended on the right. The horizontal axis shows the size of 𝐸 (the actual 
origin of the 𝐸-axis is 0; we use 10 here for presentation purposes). The vertical axis shows the 
magnitude of 𝐻. Each hec traces all possible (𝐻, 𝐸) pairs for a given level of 𝐿𝐸. To reiterate, the 
level of 𝐸 is objectively given, while the split into 𝐿𝐸 and 𝐻𝐸 – and therefore the proportion 𝐻 – 
are determined partly by the observer’s particular viewpoint. In this section we take the static 
viewpoint of a given observer. As we shall see in Section 11, however, when we move from static 
positions (levels) to dynamic trajectories (rates of change), the same conclusions can be general-
ized to all observes.   
 
Figure 5: Hierarchy-Energy Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Begin with the left-most hec (thick black line). This hec is associated with livelihood energy 
per capita 𝐿𝐸 = 25 GJ/year. When 𝐿𝐸 = 𝐸, the hec intersects the horizontal 𝐸-axis. At this in-
tersection the entire energy of society goes to livelihood, leaving nothing for the imposition of 
hierarchy. At all other points on the hec, 𝐿𝐸 < 𝐸, meaning that some of society’s energy goes to 
hierarchy. The farther to the right a point is on the hec, the greater the 𝐸. And since 𝐿𝐸 is assumed 
fixed throughout, as society moves up and to the right on the hec, an increasing share of its grow-
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ing 𝐸 goes toward the imposition of hierarchy, hence the rising 𝐻. Note, though, that since live-
lihood energy 𝐿𝐸 is positive, the fraction 𝐻 can never reach 1; it can only approach it asymptoti-
cally at higher and higher levels of 𝐸.  
The other two hecs describe (𝐻, 𝐸) combinations for higher levels of livelihood energy: the 
thin red hec is for 𝐿𝐸 = 50 GJ/year, while the dashed blue hec is for 𝐿𝐸 = 100 GJ/year. Note 
that the higher the 𝐿𝐸, the farther down and to the right the hec, and therefore the greater the level 
of both 𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸 for any given level of 𝐻 (rightward shift), the lesser the value of 𝐻 and the greater 
the value of 𝐿𝐸 for a given level of 𝐸 (downward shift), or some combination of the two (a shift 
down and to the right).  
Finally, and importantly, note that (1) a hec cannot intersect the vertical 𝐻-axis at 𝐸 = 0 
(since that would imply a society that converts no energy yet sustains a hierarchy); (2) each (𝐻, 𝐸) 
combination can lie on one and only one hec; and (3) different hecs can never touch or intersect.  
Now notice that the hes speaks not one language, but two: absolute and relative. The absolute 
language quantifies the flows of energy 𝐸, 𝐿𝐸 and 𝐻𝐸 in GJ per person/year, while the relative 
language measures the share of hierarchical energy in total energy 𝐻 as a decimal fraction. The 
underlying population is concerned mostly with the absolute magnitudes: all else remaining the 
same, the greater its 𝐿𝐸, the better off it is. For the rulers, though, the absolute numbers are merely 
means to an end. Their goal is broader and taller hierarchies, and this goal, we posit, depends not 
on the absolute GJ magnitude of hierarchical energy 𝐻𝐸, but on its relative share of the total 𝐻.  
To illustrate the importance of this linguistic duality, consider Iceland and North Korea. 
Suppose Iceland has 70 GJ per person/year flowing into hierarchy, while North Korea has only 
15. Seen through these absolute spectacles, Iceland devotes to hierarchy nearly five times more 
energy than North Korea. But when it comes to hierarchies, the yardstick is not absolute, but 
relative – and when we shift from totals to differentials, the picture in this particular case gets 
inverted. According to World Bank data, North Korea’s total per capita energy is roughly 30 GJ 
per person/year, compared to Iceland’s 700, which, given our assumption about their respective 
levels of 𝐻𝐸, means that North Korea’s 𝐻 is 0.5 (= 15/30), or five times bigger than Iceland’s 0.1 
(= 70/700). So although North Korea’s 𝐻𝐸 is far lower than Iceland’s, its much higher 𝐻 suggests 
that, all else being the same, it is likely to be the more hierarchical of the two.  
 
10.2 Lost in Hierarchy-Energy Space? 
 
As noted, while the horizontal axis of the hes is more or less objectively given, the vertical axis is 
not: it depends, at least in part, on the viewpoint of the observing analyst. Figure 6 illustrates the 
consequence of changing this viewpoint. 
The chart augments Figure 5 with a vertical dotted line that intersects the horizontal axis at 
a total energy flow of 𝐸 = 100 GJ per person/year. Now, suppose the society in question devotes 
no energy to hierarchy, so 𝐻𝐸 = 0. This situation is described by point C. And since every point 
in the ℎ𝑒𝑠 can lie on one and only one hec, the relevant curve for this society is hec 3. In order for 
this society to move up and to the right on hec 3, the total flow of energy 𝐸 must rise and the 
increase must be channelled entirely into hierarchy. Now, assume that, instead of devoting noth-
ing to hierarchy, society splits its total 100 GJ per person/year in two, with 50 going to livelihood 
and 50 to hierarchy. This situation is represented by point B located on hec 2. To move up and to 
right on the curve, society has to increase its total energy flow 𝐸 and channel all the additional 
energy into hierarchy, while to move down and to the left it has to produce less 𝐸 and curtail the 
flow into hierarchy by that exact reduction. Finally, suppose that out of the total flow of 100 GJ 
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per person/year, 25 go to livelihood and 75 to hierarchy. This situation is represented by point A 
on hec 1 – and here too, a movement up and to the right on the hec requires a greater 𝐸 with the 
addition going to hierarchy, while a move down and to the left on the curve implies a lower 𝐸 
and an equal curtailment of energy going to hierarchy. In other words, for every level of 𝐸, we 
can draw any number of hecs, each representing a different split between 𝐻𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸.  
 
Figure 6: Hierarchy-Energy Curves: Alternative Interpretations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, this vertical line with its intersecting hecs can be drawn for any given society at any 
given point in time. For instance, based on World Bank estimates, the vertical line for Iceland 
circa 2010 will cross the 𝐸-axis somewhere around 700 GJ per person year, the line for North 
Korea around 30 and the line for Afghanistan around 4. However, since we do not know the 
objective hierarchical/livelihood mix of these totals, we cannot determine the objective vertical 
location of each society. And since the mix might not be objectively given to start with, we can 
end up with different observers making different assessments. A libertarian anarchist, for exam-
ple, seeing power everywhere, might argue that most of the energy of the society depicted in 
Figure 6 goes to building and supporting hierarchy and therefore judge its location as point A. By 
contrast, a member of the ruling class, convinced that most hierarchy is in fact necessary for well-
being and therefore draws no energy away from livelihood, might insist the society in question is 
located close to point C. And a social democrat, taking the middle ground, might place it at 
point B.  
But as we shall now see, these differences do not matter for our purpose here. Our main 
concern is not the specific position of society, but its dynamic trajectory. And as it turns out, the 
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analysis of this trajectory – at least at the general level engaged with here – is independent of the 
particular hierarchy/livelihood mix and therefore applicable to any point on the hes, regardless of 
the observer.  
 
11. Trajectories in Hierarchy-Energy Space 
 
Figure 7 and Table 2 use the hes/hec framework to examine the full range of possible societal 
trajectories. We start from an arbitrary point Z. In our illustration, Z lies on a hec with 𝐿𝐸 = 25, 
at coordinates 𝐻 = 0.5 and 𝐸 = 50. Since Z is arbitrary, our analysis and conclusions hold for 
any other position on the hes.  
 
Figure 7: Trajectories in Hierarchy-Energy Space  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Trajectories in Hierarchy-Energy Space 
 Trajectory A Trajectory B Trajectory C Trajectory D 
Mode of power expanding in crisis declining democratizing 
Hierarchical energy share 𝑯 rising rising falling falling 
Livelihood energy 𝑳𝑬 rising falling falling rising 
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Beginning from Z, society can move in four general directions, denoted in the figure by four 
groups of arrows. Each group, representing a distinct trajectory, is bounded on one side by the 
hec and on the other by the horizontal dashed line going through point Z. Movements along the 
hec or the horizontal dashed line are common to two adjacent trajectories and therefore constitute 
borderline cases. An arrow represents a movement of the mode of power to a different location 
on the hes and therefore a shift to a different hec.  
Considered on a long-term time scale, each trajectory can be seen as representing a different 
phase in the evolution of a mode of power.28 The trajectories/phases are classified based on two 
criteria: changes in the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 (represented by a movement up or 
down from point Z) and changes in the level of livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 (visualized by a movement 
away from the hec to the right or to the left). Using up and down arrows to indicate an increase 
or decrease in the relevant variable, we label a mode of power expanding when (𝐻 ↑ 𝐿𝐸 ↑), in crisis 
when (𝐻 ↑ 𝐿𝐸 ↓), in decline when (𝐻 ↓ 𝐿𝐸 ↓) and democratizing when (𝐻 ↓ 𝐿𝐸 ↑). The technical 
aspects of each trajectory, summarized in Table 2, are explained in the numbered paragraphs 
below.  
 
1. Expanding (Trajectory A). The movement here is up and to the right of the hec, which means 
that both the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 and the absolute flow of livelihood energy 
𝐿𝐸 are rising. In this trajectory, more energy per capita 𝐸 gets captured, and the addition 
flows to both livelihood 𝐿𝐸 and hierarchy 𝐻𝐸. However, the increase in 𝐻𝐸 is faster than 
in 𝐸, so the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 ends up rising as well.  
 
2. In Crisis (Trajectory B). The movement here is up and to the left of the hec, which means that 
the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 and the absolute flow of livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 
move in opposite directions: the former is rising while the latter is falling. This trajectory can 
follow two distinct paths: one in which the total flow of energy 𝐸 is increasing and another 
in which it is decreasing. The first path, represented by Trajectory B1, points up and to the 
right (although still to the left of the hec). In this trajectory, both 𝐸 and 𝐻 are increasing, while 
𝐿𝐸 is falling. The second path, represented by Trajectory B2, points up and to the left. Here, 
both 𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸 are falling, while 𝐻 is rising (with 𝐻𝐸 either rising absolutely or falling more 
slowly than 𝐸). 
 
3. In Decline (Trajectory C). The movement here is down and farther to the left of the hec, which 
means that both the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 and the absolute level of livelihood 
energy 𝐿𝐸 are falling. This trajectory is an inversion of Trajectory A. Here, less energy per 
capita 𝐸 is being generated, and the deduction reduces both livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 and hierar-
chical energy 𝐻𝐸. However, the decline in 𝐻𝐸 is faster than in 𝐸, so the relative share of 
hierarchical energy 𝐻 is falling as well.  
 
4. Democratizing (Trajectory D). The movement here is down and to the right of the hec, which 
means that the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 and the absolute flow of livelihood 
energy 𝐿𝐸 move in opposite directions: the former is falling while the latter is rising. This 
trajectory is a mirror image of Trajectory B. Here too there are two distinct paths – one in 
                                                 
28 Trajectories could also be viewed from a shorter-term perspective, though we leave the analysis of such 
movements to future studies. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 43 – 
which the total flow of energy 𝐸 is rising and another in which it is falling. The first path, 
represented by Trajectory D1, points down and to the right. In this trajectory, both 𝐸 and 𝐿𝐸 
are increasing, while 𝐻 is falling. The second path, represented by Trajectory D2, points down 
and to the left (although still to the right of the hec). Here, both 𝐸 and 𝐻 are falling, while 𝐿𝐸 
is rising. 
 
Let us now look more closely at each trajectory in turn. 
 
11.1 Growing Through Sabotage 
  
We call Trajectory A an ‘expanding mode of power’ because the share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 
and the level of livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 are both rising. This dual increase helps keep the mode of 
power in place: the rise in 𝐻 sustains and augments the hierarchical structure, while the increase 
in 𝐿𝐸, by catering to the underlying population, masks the growth of hierarchies, reduces re-
sistance from below and limits the risk of systemic upheaval.  
Trajectory A is historically new. As already noted, until a few hundred years ago, modes of 
power have experienced very little and often no increase in total energy per capita, let alone in 
livelihood energy per capita (Figure 1 and Table 1). The first and – as of today – only mode of 
power in which both 𝐻 and 𝐿𝐸 have risen on an ongoing basis is capitalism (the second is state 
communism, though that regime faltered and disintegrated within a short historical moment).  
Now, on its own, the observation that capitalism goes hand in hand with growing energy per 
capita is hardly breaking news. The interesting thing, rather, is that a substantial part of this 
growth flows – and indeed must flow – not into wellbeing, but into hierarchical power. This latter 
claim is crucial: if true, it means that when we measure capitalist growth, we measure, at least in 
part, the growth of power itself. In this sense, capitalism grows not despite or even because of sabo-
tage, but through sabotage.  
Figure 8 and Table 3 illustrate this point by comparing three A-type trajectories – A1, A2 and 
A3. The trajectories share two things in common: first, they all represent the doubling of energy 
per capita 𝐸 (from 50 to 100 GJ/year); and second, in all of them the change in both livelihood 
energy and the share of hierarchical energy is non-negative (so Δ𝐿𝐸/𝐿𝐸 ≥ 0% and Δ𝐻/𝐻 ≥ 0%). 
A1 and A3 are borderline trajectories, delineating the limits of the possible in an expanding mode 
of power. A1 represents the minimum rate of change of livelihood energy (Δ𝐿𝐸/𝐿𝐸 = 0%) and 
the maximum change of the hierarchical share of energy (which, in this case, is Δ𝐻/𝐻 = +50%), 
while A3 marks the minimum rate of change of the hierarchical share of energy (Δ𝐻/𝐻 = 0%) 
and the maximum rate of change of livelihood energy (in this case, Δ𝐿𝐸/𝐿𝐸 = +100%). 
Note that, with the exception of the borderline Trajectory A3, the hierarchical energy share 𝐻 
is always growing, which in turn means that the growth of livelihood energy is always slower than 
the growth of total energy (so Δ𝐸/𝐸 > Δ𝐿𝐸/𝐿𝐸). This growth differential is important because, 
if the flow of livelihood energy correlates with wellbeing, it follows that, in an expanding mode 
of power such as capitalism, headline increases of total energy per capita are likely to overstate – 
and possibly by a wide margin – the growth of society’s welfare.  
Note also that the faster the growth rate of total energy per capita Δ𝐸/𝐸 (i.e., the more the 
arrow extends to the right), the higher the maximum growth rate of the hierarchical share of 
energy Δ𝐻/𝐻 (i.e., the more the trajectory can be ‘pulled up’ toward the hec). This relationship is 
important because, if higher per capita energy ends up steepening the trajectory so as to channel 
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a greater portion of the energy into hierarchy, then this tendency might offer an alternative expla-
nation for why energy per capita correlates positively with hierarchy.  
 
Figure 8: Three Trajectories in an Expanding Mode of Power  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Three Trajectories in an Expanding Mode of Power 
 
Total Energy  
per capita 𝑬 
Livelihood Energy  
per capita 𝑳𝑬 
Hierarchical Energy as a 
Share of Total Energy 𝑯 
Level  
(GJ/year) 
Growth 
Rate 
Level  
(GJ/year) 
Growth 
Rate 
Share 
(decimal) 
Growth 
Rate 
Trajectory A1 100 + 100% 25 0% 0.75 + 50% 
Trajectory A2 100 + 100% 40 + 60% 0.60 + 20% 
Trajectory A3 100 + 100% 50 + 100% 0.50 0% 
 
Recall that, according to the economies-of-scale argument, the correlation between energy 
and hierarchy is rooted in organizational effectiveness: hierarchy is seen as the most effective way 
of coordinating large-scale human endeavours, so the more hierarchical the society, the greater 
its energy capture per capita (depth). Based on our power rationale here, though, the causal chain 
runs in reverse. Power hierarchies, we argue, are built not to increase energy capture per capita, 
but for their own sake. Erecting and maintaining these hierarchies, however, requires plenty of 
strategic sabotage, and strategic sabotage – and this is the key link here – requires lots of energy. 
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This latter requirement means that hierarchy is capped, literally, by the ability of society to ‘fuel 
it’, and that cap, together with the drive for power, explains why higher energy per capita both 
enables and tends to correlate with more hierarchy. (The determinants of energy capture per cap-
ita – including the specific mix of hierarchy and cooperation – are of course important. But since 
the ultimate goal here is not more energy, but greater power, these determinants are perhaps better 
examined as means to an end rather than the end itself.)29  
What determines the trajectory of an expanding mode of power such as capitalism? At the 
most general level, we can think of two contradicting forces: the Machiavellian drive to augment 
power for its own sake, and the opposing quest, pointed out by de La Boétie, to undo power and 
augment autonomy (see Subsection 4.2).  
The Machiavellian force, whether deliberate or emergent, constantly pulls the mode of power 
toward the hec, so that more and more of the per capita energy can be used for hierarchical ends. 
This drive, though, is self-limiting. Over the longer run, more hierarchy requires faster energy 
growth – yet, as we suggested in Sections 5 to 7, too much hierarchy might undermine the cap-
turing of energy per capita and therefore serve to restrict or even reduce energy growth (compared 
to what might be achieved via autonomous cooperation). If this suggestion is correct, moving on 
or close to the hec could end up limiting the pace at which the mode of power moves to the right 
and, by extension, its ability to augment its hierarchies. Moreover, and importantly, all else being 
the same, the closer a mode of power gets to the hec, the lower the growth of livelihood energy 
and therefore the greater the potential resistance; and since greater resistance tends to require 
more energy to sustain any given level of hierarchy, the ability to boost hierarchy is restricted 
even further.  
The second, negating force – de La Boétie’s quest for autonomy – pushes the mode of power 
in the opposite direction. Most of the time, this quest for autonomy is latent and largely invisible. 
But occasionally it erupts, usually unpredictably, to stir society, if only for a brief historical mo-
ment, toward greater creativity, cooperation and self-rule (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 19-21).30  
Now, on the face of it, the two forces negate one another: Machiavelli’s gravitational force 
pulls the mode of power toward the hec (Trajectory A1), while de La Boétie’s repelling force pushes 
it way from the hec (toward Trajectories A2 and ultimately A3). On a deeper level, though, the 
relationship between them might prove more complex. As noted, one of our propositions in this 
article is that the energy capture per capita is affected by both hierarchy and cooperation, and that 
excessive hierarchy might actually undermine this efficiency.31 Paradoxically, however, this co-
                                                 
29 The energy constraint on hierarchy is alluded to – though from a totally different perspective – by Fix 
(2017: Appendix I). To illustrate his argument, Fix models a fictional feudal/agricultural society. For sim-
plicity, the model assumes that only the lowest level of the hierarchy – the serfs – produces energy, while the 
remaining levels merely consume it, and then goes on to compute the minimum level of per capita energy 
necessary for a given level of hierarchy. This model, though, does not reflect the fact that hierarchies generate 
resistance, and that overcoming this resistance requires energy over and above that consumed by the higher 
strata of the hierarchies – regardless of whether these strata themselves contribute to production or not.  
30 Some of the more well-known eruptions of this kind include the events leading to the Second English 
Civil War of 1648-1649 and the creation of the Commonwealth of England, the 1789 onset of the French 
Revolution, the Haitian slave rebellion of 1791-1804, the European revolutions of 1848 (the so-called 
Spring of Nations), the Paris Commune of 1871, the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Hungarian Revolt of 
1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, the May 1968 uprising in France, the late 1970s insurrection against the 
Shah of Iran, the anti-communist wave of the 1980s, the Korean student uprising of the early 1980s, the 
First Palestinian Intifada of 1988 and the Arab Spring of the early 2010s. 
31 Since autonomous cooperation can use hierarchy if needed but hierarchy can rarely if ever invoke au-
tonomy (Section 5.1), it follows that, in principle, an autonomously organized society can match or ex-
ceed the per capita energy capture of a hierarchical mode of power, if it so chooses. Whether this choice, 
with all of its ramifications, is deemed desirable in practice is of course another matter altogether. 
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determination means that, over the longer haul, de La Boétie’s repelling force might end up boost-
ing hierarchy. By pushing society’s trajectory down from and to the right of the hec, this force 
reduces the energy share of hierarchy 𝐻, leading to less hierarchy and more cooperation. And if 
this shift toward greater cooperation ends up increasing energy per capita 𝐸, the ever-present 
Machiavellian force is likely to kick back, pulling society back toward the hec – though at a higher 
𝐻 than before. With this in mind, we shouldn’t be surprised to see modes of power with a history 
of open contestation end up being more hierarchical than those whose hierarchies remain undis-
turbed.  
At this point, our framework is too rudimentary to allow further analysis of these two forces. 
What we can say, however, is that in order for a mode of power to continue to expand within the 
confines of Trajectory A, the balance between these two forces has to change in line with the mode 
of power’s position in the hes: de La Boétie’s repelling force must strengthen and eventually ex-
ceed Machiavelli’s gravitational force the closer the mode of power gets to Trajectory A1; and, 
conversely, Machiavelli’s force must become stronger and ultimately surpass de La Boétie’s as 
the mode of power approaches Trajectory A3. If this relative strengthening/weakening fails to oc-
cur, the mode of power will either fall into crisis (Trajectory B) or democratize (Trajectory D). 
   
11.2 Crisis 
 
The potential for crisis emerges when the share of hierarchical energy increases while the level of 
livelihood energy declines. This situation is illustrated by Trajectories B1 and B2 in Figure 7. Recall 
that when a mode of power moves up and to the right on the hec, the entire increase in total energy 
per capita goes to hierarchy while livelihood energy remains unchanged. Trajectory B1 represents 
the ‘tipping’ of this borderline case: energy per capita is still growing, along with the share of 
hierarchical energy, but livelihood energy, instead of remaining constant, is now falling.  
This decline is an invitation for trouble. As noted, in historical modes of power, rulers and 
subjects do not fight over the same thing and therefore rarely speak the same language: the sub-
jects, preoccupied with their own material conditions, talk in absolute terms of wellbeing, while 
the rulers, obsessed with power, denominate their aspirations, actions and achievements in dif-
ferential terms and relative positions. Now, as long as livelihood energy per capita is rising (Tra-
jectory A), most subjects remain busy with their daily lives, paying little or no attention to expand-
ing power, rising hierarchy and growing sabotage. But when livelihood energy per capita comes 
to a standstill (movement on the hec), the conflict between the two groups suddenly sharpens into 
focus; and when livelihood energy actually drops (Trajectory B1), the clash between wellbeing and 
hierarchical power comes to the fore. 
At this point, the rulers face a systemic crossroad. They can relent by restricting the share of 
hierarchical energy in order to allow livelihood energy per capita to recover and perhaps even 
grow (i.e., shifting the mode of power back to Trajectory A1 or even A2) – a move that might also 
help boost total energy per capita (assuming that less hierarchy and more autonomous coopera-
tion make for greater societal flexibility). Or they can remain unrelenting, allowing the situation 
to devolve into a full-blown crisis. In this latter case, the atmosphere becomes combative, the 
rulers harden their stance even further, and the share of hierarchical energy continues to rise. This 
further diversion creates a toxic combination of rising sabotage and falling livelihood energy, 
which in turn undermines the cooperative aspects of production. At this point, the conversion of 
energy – which previously was still rising – might start to decline, and when that happens, the 
mode of power shifts from a tentative crisis (Trajectory B1) to a full-blown one (Trajectory B2). Total 
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energy per capita is now contracting, and if the rulers, feeling under assault, fortify their power 
with even more hierarchy, livelihood energy, which previously declined only slowly, is bound to 
drop rapidly.  
  
11.3 Decline 
 
If the crisis is prolonged, there is now a distinct possibility that, instead of recovering, the mode 
of power will be sucked into a downward spiral and perhaps even terminal decline. Such decline 
is represented by Trajectory C. In this phase, all energy flows per capita – total 𝐸, hierarchical 𝐻𝐸 
and livelihood 𝐿𝐸 – are falling. But unlike in the crisis phase, here hierarchical energy 𝐻𝐸 falls 
even faster than overall energy 𝐸, causing the relative share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 to decline as 
well. This latter decline suggests that existing hierarchies can no longer be maintained and might 
start crumbling, breaking down into smaller, less complex assemblages. The mode of power, hav-
ing been significantly weakened, becomes susceptible to a takeover by another mode of power 
(for example, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the absorption of its remnants into capitalism), 
or complete collapse (for instance, the fall of the ancient Roman Empire, the implosion and dis-
appearance of the Easter Island society or the more recent failure of states such as Somalia, Congo 
and Southern Sudan, among others). 
 
11.4 Democratization 
 
The radical alternative to crisis and decline, situated on the opposite side of the hes, is a shift 
toward democratization, represented by Trajectories D1 and D2. We use the term ‘democratiza-
tion’ here not in the narrow and indirect sense of political representation, but in the broad and 
direct sense of ancient Greece’s demos-kratia: the rule of the people themselves. From this view-
point, a democratizing mode of power is one that reduces hierarchical power in favour of direct 
self-rule and autonomous cooperation, and which does so throughout society.  
In terms of movement on the hes, the main hallmark of this trajectory is that livelihood energy 
and the share of hierarchical energy move in opposite directions, with 𝐿𝐸 rising and 𝐻 falling. 
Like with the crisis phase, here too there are two distinct possibilities: the first, denoted by Trajec-
tory D1, is one in which total energy per capita continues to increase, while the second, repre-
sented by Trajectory D2, is one in which total energy per capita declines. 
Trajectory D1 is based on the premise, discussed in Sections 5 to 7, that societal efficiency in 
general and energy capture in particular are boosted by autonomous cooperation, and that under 
certain circumstances reductions in hierarchy might serve to augment total energy per capita. 
Thus, when the share of hierarchical energy 𝐻 declines, livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 gets a double boost 
– one from the redirection of existing energy, and another from the faster growth of total energy 
per capita.  
A democratizing mode of power, though, can go even further by curtailing total energy per 
capita in the first place. This ‘green’ possibility is illustrated by Trajectory D2, a regime in which 𝐻 
and 𝐸 are both falling, yet, since the contraction of the former is faster than that of the latter, 
livelihood energy 𝐿𝐸 is nonetheless rising. 
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12. Summary, Reflections and Extensions 
 
12.1 Cognitive Dissonance  
 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by cognitive dissonance. While 
neoclassical economists and mainstream political theorists were busy concocting a rigorous 
mathematical ideology of a perfectly competitive economy nested in a laissez faire democratic 
polity (or vice versa), capitalism was moving decidedly in the opposite direction. One aspect of 
this movement was the rise of hierarchical organizations and large power coalitions, including 
giant corporations with transnational tentacles, large labour unions, political parties and gov-
ernment bureaucracies. The other aspect was a growing bellicosity fuelled by military build-
ups, rampant racism and imperial wars. The picture-perfect Comtean vision of a flat, peaceful 
capitalism governed by voluntary productive interactions was overshadowed by an increasingly 
vertical reality of power, coercion and violence.     
Liberals have reacted to this cognitive dissonance mostly by denying it. The problem, most 
of them insist, lies squarely with reality: instead of playing by the eternal liberal rules, it keeps 
distorting them. Fortunately, though, there is no reason to worry. In the long run, reality is 
deeply Galtonian: it always reverts back to its natural (read liberal) fundamentals. Thus, given 
enough time, Wilson’s Fourteen Point plan was bound to establish world peace, just as the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of our central banks are bound to Pareto-opti-
mize the global economy and restore its competitive ‘micro foundations’. And if these long-
term reversions nonetheless fail to occur, it is only because, as Keynes famously put it, ‘In the 
long run we are all dead’ (1923: 80, original emphasis). 
Critical political economists, particularly neo-Marxists and post-Keynesians, have pre-
sented a more sinister view. The rise of hierarchical institutions and organizations and the 
growing role of power and violence, they claim, were no accident. Capitalism, they argue, has 
been fundamentally transformed. Growing monopolization and the rise of large governments 
have shifted the emphasis from supply to demand. Instead of counteracting the falling tendency 
of the rate of profit emphasized by Marx, the key problem now is how to offset the system’s 
rising surplus. And the main solution to this problem, many of them maintain, is institutional-
ized waste – primarily high military expenditures, an expanding financial sector and massive 
legitimation spending – activities whose ultimate role is to absorb the surplus without creating 
more of it (Bichler and Nitzan 2012b). 
Note, though, that neither reaction questions the nature of capital itself. Both continue to 
treat capital as a ‘real’ material-economic entity rooted in production and consumption and there-
fore as growth-dependent. Power institutions and processes can affect this growth – and therefore 
capital – negatively or positively, depending on the theory, but the impact is always external: 
power in this scheme lies outside of capital, so its exercise has no bearing on the material-
economic nature of accumulation as such.32 
                                                 
32 One of the few to realize the importance of this neglect was Paul Sweezy. In his assessment of Monopoly 
Capital (1966), a book he had co-authored with Paul Baran 25 years earlier, Sweezy admitted that there 
was something very big missing from the Marxist and neoclassical frameworks: a coherent theory of cap-
ital accumulation. His reflections are worth quoting at some length because they show both the problem 
and why economics as such is unable to solve it: 
 
Why did Monopoly Capital fail to anticipate the changes in the structure and functioning of the 
system that have taken place in the last twenty-five years? Basically, I think the answer is that 
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In this sense, the CasP approach is radically different. Here, capital is not a material-eco-
nomic entity affected by power. It is power – and indeed nothing but power. From this viewpoint, 
the growth of hierarchy and the strategic sabotage it entails do not distort or prop accumulation; 
they are accumulation. Moreover, insofar as hierarchy and sabotage lessen societal efficiency 
and undermine growth, up to the strategic Goldilocks point of ‘business as usual’, the conse-
quence is not to abate accumulation, but to boost it (Nitzan and Bichler 2000: Figures 5.1 and 
5.2, pp. 79-80).  
 
12.2 Inverting the Link  
  
Our paper has both extended and transcended this claim. The question we have tried to address 
here is not why capitalism grows more slowly than it otherwise can, but how, with so much 
sabotage, it can grow in the first place.  
Our first step in answering this question was to invert the conventional link between hier-
archy and energy. The mainstream economies-of-scale theory, we pointed out, claims that so-
cial efficiency in general and the ability to capture energy in particular hinge on coordinating 
social complexity, and that the most effective way of achieving such coordination is through 
hierarchical organizations. This claim, we further noted, is consistent with the path-breaking 
research of Blair Fix, which shows that energy growth and organizational size/hierarchies go 
hand in hand. But then, causality – and here we come to the crucial point – could also run in 
reverse: where the conventional eye sees more hierarchy generating more energy, the inverted 
eye sees more energy fuelling taller hierarchies. 
Our reason for inverting this link was twofold. First, social efficiency and energy capture, 
we argued, are often enhanced by autonomous cooperation. Second and more importantly, in 
the final analysis, hierarchical societies, including capitalism, are driven not by the desire for 
more energy as such, but by the quest for more power. Hierarchical power, though, and this is 
key, is always imposed against opposition, so its imposition depends on strategic sabotage; and 
since the exertion of strategic sabotage requires plenty of energy, hierarchy and energy capture 
end up being tightly correlated. In other words, energy still plays an important role, but as a 
means to an end rather than an end in itself. 
  
  
                                                 
its conceptualization of the capital accumulation process is one-sided and incomplete. In the established 
tradition of both mainstream and Marxian economics, we treated capital accumulation as being 
essentially a matter of adding to the stock of existing capital goods. But in reality this is only one 
aspect of the process. Accumulation is also a matter of adding to the stock of financial assets. 
The two aspects are of course interrelated, but the nature of this interrelation is problematic to 
say the least. The traditional way of handling the problem has been in effect to assume it away: 
for example, buying stocks and bonds (two of the simpler forms of financial assets) is assumed 
to be merely an indirect way of buying real capital goods. This is hardly ever true, and it can be 
totally misleading. This is not the place to try to point the way to a more satisfactory conceptu-
alization of the capital accumulation process. It is at best an extremely complicated and difficult 
problem, and I am frank to say that I have no clues to its solution. But I can say with some 
confidence that achieving a better understanding of the monopoly capitalist society of today will 
be possible only on the basis of a more adequate theory of capital accumulation, with special 
emphasis on the interaction of its real and financial aspects, than we now possess. (Sweezy 1991, 
emphasis added) 
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12.3 Waste as Investment  
 
Viewed from this perspective, most of the expenditures that neo-Marxists and post-Keynesians 
consider wasteful might in fact qualify as proper investments. Nowadays, the term ‘investment’ 
is used to denote the creation of new productive capacity. But that was not always the case. In 
feudal Europe, where the term originally comes from, investment – or ‘investiture’ as it was 
then known – had nothing to do with production. Instead, it denoted legal seizure, pure and 
simple; an exclusive vested power over a given domain (Bloch 1961: 173; 349; Ganshof 1964: 
97; 126; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 227-228). And as Veblen pointed out, this essential feature 
remains unchanged: investment capitalizes earnings, and earnings are always generated and 
backed by the vested right to sabotage (Veblen 1923: 65-66).  
 Now, if we apply this latter criterion to what critical thinkers classify as institutionalized 
waste, we end up with a theoretical problem: based on this criterion, military expenditures, the 
legal system, financial intermediation, bureaucracies, advertisement, propaganda and religious 
organizations generate capitalist income; and according the theorists of institutionalized waste, 
activities that generate capitalist income cannot be deemed wasteful, by definition. Viewed 
from the perspective of capitalists, the key role of these activities is to bolster hierarchical power; 
and insofar as this bolstering translates into higher capitalized earnings, the activities that gen-
erate these higher earnings qualify as sound investments. Indeed, without these hierarchical 
investments there would probably be no accumulation of capital as power in the first place.  
 
12.4 The Two Languages  
  
Our second step in exploring the relationship of energy and hierarchical power was to separate 
energy capture into two distinct flows: hierarchical and livelihood. From a bio-physical per-
spective the two flows might look identical, but from a societal viewpoint they are very differ-
ent, if not orthogonal. Livelihood energy affects the wellbeing of the underlying population, for 
whom the relevant yardstick is absolute (more joules). Hierarchical energy, by contrast, bolsters 
the power of the rulers, and since power is a differential entity, the proper measure here is 
relative (a greater decimal share of the total). In other words, from the very outset, we need not 
one language, but two – absolute for livelihood, relative for hierarchy.  
Translating one language into the other, though, is not straightforward. On the face of it, 
both flows draw on the total energy of society, so one might expect that, for any given level of 
total energy, more livelihood would mean less hierarchy, and vice versa. But in general this is 
not the case. Since livelihood is absolute and hierarchical power is relative, more livelihood can 
go hand in hand with more as well as less hierarchy, just as more hierarchy can coexist with 
more or less livelihood, and it is this richer set of possibilities that needs be deciphered.    
 
12.5 An Alternative Hierarchy-Energy Model 
 
Our third step, then, was to outline an alternative hierarchy-energy model. The model, which 
juxtaposes and relates various combinations of livelihood and hierarchical energy, offers im-
portant insights into how modes of power operate and evolve. In its general form, this model 
can be used to examine capitalism as well as other modes power, and it can account for the full 
spectrum of hierarchy-energy trajectories. The following points summarize some of its key fea-
tures and implications: 
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1. Trajectories. Based on its particular trajectory, a mode of power can be classified as expand-
ing, in crisis, declining or democratizing. 
 
2. The two forces. Modes of power are subject to two conflicting forces: a Machiavellian force 
that drives for more power hierarchies, and an opposing force, fashioned after de La Boe ́tie, 
that seeks greater autonomy and cooperation. The balance of these two forces affects the 
particular trajectory a mode of power follows.  
 
3. Growing through sabotage. In an expanding mode of power such as capitalism, the balance 
of these two forces allows both the hierarchical share of energy and the level of livelihood 
energy to rise. In this trajectory, the absolute flow of hierarchical energy always grows faster 
than total energy, which in turn means that headline measures of growth tend to overstate 
the growth of wellbeing, possibly by a very wide margin. In this sense, we can say that a 
mode of power grows, at least in part, not despite or because of sabotage, but through sab-
otage.   
  
4. Energy leads hierarchy. Since erecting and maintaining hierarchies require energy, the 
growth of energy sets the upper limit on the growth of hierarchy. Now, since hierarchy is 
not necessarily the most effective way of capturing energy, and given the ever-present quest 
for more hierarchical power, it seems more likely that energy leads hierarchy rather than 
the other way around. 
  
5. The dialectics of resistance. When successful, resistance to power tends to reduce hierarchy. 
This reduction, though, might not last for long: successful resistance augments autonomy, 
and if we are correct to argue that greater autonomy tends to boost the capture of energy, 
the result is to elevate the energy cap on hierarchy and therefore enable the erection of even 
taller hierarchies. This type of flexible zig-zag might explain why capitalist hierarchies, be-
ing subject to periodic contestations, are broader and taller as well as more resilient than 
those of other modes of power. 
 
6. Crisis and decline vs. democratization. Left unchecked, the Machiavellian quest for ever more 
power invites crisis, and possibly decline and collapse. The opposite force, de La Boe ́tie’s 
quest for autonomy, offers an opening for democratization. Historically, the former force 
seems stronger than the latter: most modes of power expand, fall into crisis and occasion-
ally decline and disintegrate; only on rare occasions do they move toward greater auton-
omy – and when they do, the experience is usually short-lived. 
  
7. Closed vs. open histories. An expanding mode of power is locked into a narrow path where 
the hierarchical share of energy and the absolute flow of livelihood energy both rise. By 
contrast, crisis and democratization are more open-ended.33 In both of them, there is a 
historical choice to be made. In the case of crisis, the rulers must decide whether to lessen 
their pressure and allow livelihood energy to re-expand, or press for even taller hierarchies 
at a risk of systemic disintegration and decline. Similarly with democratization. Here, it is 
                                                 
33 We are indebted to Daniel Moure for pointing out this important difference. 
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the contesting underlying population that faces a choice: it can either allow total energy 
per capita to continue rising (and in so doing leave the door open for taller hierarchies in 
the future), or it can intensify the pressure toward a green, de-growth society and the radical 
dismantling of hierarchies. 
 
12.6 Looking Ahead 
 
The organization of society in general and its hierarchical structures in particular are intimately 
connected to energy. Without understanding this crucial connection, any effort to fundamen-
tally change society is likely to be futile at best and disastrous at worse. And yet, as it stands, 
this connection, particularly when applied to the rapidly changing capitalist epoch, remains 
highly opaque: we know scarcely anything about hierarchies; save for broad generalizations, 
we know even less about the social role of energy; and we are pretty much in the dark regarding 
the way in which they intertwine.  
The challenge here is both theoretical and empirical. The innovative work of Blair Fix 
shows that the size and inner hierarchies of corporations and governments are positively cor-
related with total energy per capita. But this is merely the bottom of the hierarchical iceberg. 
The micro hierarchies of organizations are themselves nested in meso and meta hierarchies that 
rank and connect organizations, ideas and the societal algorithms that govern their actions, and 
this full-spectrum hierarchy is yet to be conceptually and empirically mapped, even tentatively. 
The other challenge is to theorize and measure the basic split between hierarchical and 
livelihood energy. As noted, this split is always coloured by our theoretical and ideological 
dispositions and can therefore never be entirely objective. But given its crucial importance for 
understanding power and resistance to power, it is necessary that we conceive of ways to define 
and quantify it, however broadly and inaccurately.  
Contemporary capitalism seems to be pushing the natural and theoretical envelope. Its 
growing energy capture threatens the stability of the planet’s biosphere, resources and climate, 
while its ideology denies that, soon enough, this entire regime is bound to come to a screeching 
halt. The math on this matter is straightforward. If overall energy capture continues to expand 
at the same rate it has grown over the past century (roughly 2.3 per cent a year): 
  
In 275, 345, and 400 years, we demand all the sunlight hitting land and then the earth 
as a whole, assuming 20%, 100%, and 100% conversion efficiencies, respectively. In 
1350 years, we use as much power as the sun generates. In 2450 years, we use as much 
as all hundred-billion stars in the Milky Way galaxy. (Murphy 2011)  
 
The conventional view is to blame this impasse on ‘our wants’. Even Earl Cook, one of the 
first to map the history of energy capture, fell into this neoclassical trap of eternally ‘unsatiated 
desires’: 
  
The more power an industrial society disposes of, the more it wants. The more power 
we use, the more we shape our cities and mold our economic and social institutions to 
be dependent on the application of power and the consumption of energy. (Cook 1971: 
140, emphases added) 
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But as this article has tried to point out, the real force driving this process is not our hedonic 
desires, but the rulers’ quest for power. Much of the energy captured by humanity is not used 
to improve livelihood, but to fortify hierarchies, not to boost wellbeing, but to fuel strategic 
sabotage. For the vast majority of the world’s population, this energy is best left uncaptured.  
But in order for us to move in that direction, we need to understand how energy is used to 
subjugate us. Without this knowledge, even if sketchy, we will continue to think and act blind-
foldedly. We will be unable to understand how hierarchical energy evolved in earlier modes of 
power; we will have only a partial and misleading understanding of how it supports the full-
spectrum hierarchy of capitalism; and most importantly, we will be unable to imagine non-
hierarchical structures that might stand against and perhaps replace capitalism.  
 
References  
 
Adami, Christoph, Jory Schossau, and Arend Hintze. 2016. Evolutionary Game Theory Using 
Agent-Based Methods. Physics of Life Reviews 19: 1-26. 
Albritton, Robert. 2009. Let Them Eat Junk. How Capitalism Creates Hunger and Obesity. London 
and New York: Pluto Press. Distributed in the United States of America exclusively by 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Asimakopulos, A. 1978. An Introduction to Economic Theory: Microeconomics. Toronto and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Babchenko, Arkadiæi. 2008. One Soldier's War in Chechnya. Translated from the Russian by 
Nick Allen. London: Portobello. 
Baines, Joseph. 2014. Food Price Inflation as Redistribution: Towards a New Analysis of 
Corporate Power in the World Food System. New Political Economy 19 (1, January): 79-
112. 
Baines, Joseph. 2015. Price and Income Dynamics in the Agri-Food System: A Disaggregate 
Perspective. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, York 
University. 
Baines, Joseph. 2017. Accumulating through Food Crisis? Farmers, Commodity Traders and 
the Distributional Politics of Financialization. Published Online on March 29. Review of 
International Political Economy. 
Baraba ́si, Albert-La ́szlo ́. 2014. Linked. How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What it 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life. New York: Basic Books. 
Barabási, Albert-László, and Réka Albert. 1999. Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. 
Science 286 (15 October): 509-512. 
Baraba ́si, Albert-La ́szlo ́, and Eric Bonabeau. 2003. Scale-Free Networks. Scientific American 
(May 2003): 50-59. 
Baran, Paul. A., and Paul M. Sweezy. 1966. Monopoly Capital. An Essay on the American 
Economic and Social Order. New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks. 
Barnet, Richard J. 1980. The Lean Years. Politics in the Age of Scarcity. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Bek, Aleksandr, and Momysh-Uly Baurdzhan. 1969. Volokolamsk Highway. 2nd Revised ed, 
Soviet novels series. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 1996. Putting the State In Its Place: US Foreign 
Policy and Differential Accumulation in Middle-East "Energy Conflicts". Review of 
International Political Economy 3 (4): 608-661. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 54 – 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2001. From War Profits to Peace Dividends. Hebrew. 
Jerusalem: Carmel. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2012a. Capital as Power: Toward a New Cosmology 
of Capitalism. Real-World Economics Review (61, September): 65-84. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2012b. Imperialism and Financialism: The Story of 
a Nexus. Journal of Critical Globalization Studies (5, January): 42-78. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2014a. How Capitalists Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Crisis. Real-World Economics Review (66, January): 65-73. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2014b. No Way Out: Crime, Punishment and the 
Limits to Power. Crime, Law and Social Change. 61 (3, April): 251-271. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015a. Capital Accumulation: Fiction and Reality. 
Real-World Economics Review (72, September 30): 47-78. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015b. The CasP Project: Past, Present, Future. 
Working Papers on Capital as Power (2015/04, December): 1-29. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015c. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review 
(70, February): 49-79. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2016a. Capitalizing Obesity. Research Note 
(2016/02): 1-4. 
Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2016b. A CasP Model of the Stock Market. Real-
World Economic Review (77, December): 119-154. 
Bichler, Shimshon, Jonathan Nitzan, and Tim Di Muzio. 2012. The 1%, Exploitation and 
Wealth: Tim Di Muzio interviews Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. Review of 
Capital as Power 1 (1): 1-22. 
Bichler, Shimshon, Jonathan Nitzan, and Piotr Dutkiewicz. 2013. Capitalism as a Mode of 
Power: Piotr Dutkiewicz in Conversation with Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. In 
22 Ideas to Fix the World: Conversations with the World's Foremost Thinkers, edited by P. 
Dutkiewicz and R. Sakwa. New York: New York University Press and the Social Science 
Research Council, pp. 326-354. 
Bloch, Marc. 1961. Feudal Society. Translated from the French by L.A. Manyon. Forward by 
M. M. Postman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bohm, David. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Bohm, David, and David F. Peat. 1987. Science, Order, and Creativity. London: Bantham Books. 
Bosse, Malcolm J. 1983. The Warlord. A Novel. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. 2011. A Cooperative Species. Human Reciprocity and its 
Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Buckley, Peter J., and Malcolm Chapman. 1997. The Perception and Measurement of 
Transaction Costs. Cambridge Journal of Economics 21: 127-145. 
Bunge, Mario Augusto. 1961. Causality, Chance, and Law. American Scientist 49 (4, 
December): 432-448. 
Bunge, Mario Augusto. 1979. Causality and Modern Science. 3d Revised ed. New York: Dover 
Publications. 
Capra, Fritjof. 1996. The Web of Life. A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems. 1st Anchor 
Books ed. New York: Anchor Books. 
Choi, Jung-Kyoo, and Samuel Bowles. 2007. The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War. 
Science 318 (26 October): 636-640. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (16, November): 386-405. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 55 – 
Cochrane, D. T. 2015. What’s Love Got to Do with It? Diamonds and the Accumulation of De Beers, 
1935-55. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Graduate Program in Social and Political 
Thought, York University. 
Cochrane, D. T. 2016. Differentiating Diamonds: Transforming Knowledge and the 
Accumulation of De Beers. Working Papers on Capital as Power (2017/01, January): 1-36. 
Cook, Earl. 1971. The Flow of Energy in an Industrial Society. Scientific American 225 (3, 
September): 135-144. 
de La Boe ́tie, Estienne. 1975. The Politics of Obedience. The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. 
Introduction by Murray N. Rothbard. Translated by Harry Kurz. Originally published in 
French in 1552-53. Montreal: Black Rose Books. 
Debailleul, Corentin, Shimshon Bichler, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2016. Theory and Praxis, 
Theory and Practice, Practical Theory. Working Papers on Capital as Power (2016/01, 
February): 1-13. 
Di Muzio, Tim. 2015. The 1% and the Rest of Us. A Political Economy of Dominant Ownership. 
London: Zed Books. 
Di Muzio, Tim, and Richard H. Robbins. 2016. Debt as Power. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Diamond, Jared M. 1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel. The Fate of Human Societies. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co. 
Diamond, Jared M. 2012. The World Until Yesterday. What Can We Learn From Traditional 
Societies? New York: Viking. 
Dunbar, R. I. M. 1992. Neocortext Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates. Journal of 
Human Evolution 22 (6, June): 469-493. 
Farrington, Benjamin. 1969. Science in Antiquity. 2nd ed, A Galaxy Book. London and New 
York.: Oxford U.P. 
Faul, Moira V. 2016. Networks and Power: Why Networks are Hierarchical Not Flat and 
What Can be Done About It. Global Policy 7 (2, May): 185-197. 
Fix, Blair. 2015a. Putting Power Back Into Growth Theory. Review of Capital as Power 2 (1): 1-
37. 
Fix, Blair. 2015b. Rethinking Economic Growth Theory from a Biophysical Perspective. New York: 
Springer. 
Fix, Blair. 2016. Energy and Institution Size. Working Papers on Capital as Power (2016/04, 
June): 1-56. 
Fix, Blair. 2017. Energy and Institution Size. PLoS ONE 12 (2, February 8): 1-22 + appendices. 
Frankfort, Henri. 1951. The Birth of Civilization in the Near East. London: Williams & Norgate. 
Frankfort, Henri, and H. A. Groenewegen-Frankfort. 1946. The Emancipation of Thought 
from Myth. In The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man. An Essay on Speculative Thought in 
the Ancient Near East, edited by H. Frankfort, H. A. Groenewegen-Frankfort, J. A. Wilson, 
T. Jacobsen and W. A. Irwin. Chicago: The University of Chicago press, pp. 363-388. 
Frankfort, Henri, H. A. Groenewegen-Frankfort, John Albert Wilson, Thorkild Jacobsen, and 
William Andrew Irwin. 1946. The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man. An Essay on 
Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East. Chicago: The University of Chicago press. 
Ganshof, François Louis. 1964. Feudalism. 3rd English ed. New York: Harper & Row. 
Gary, Romain. 1958. The Roots of Heaven. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Gavrilets, Sergey, David G. Anderson, and Peter Turchin. 2010. Cycling in the Complexity of 
Early Societies. Cliodynamics: the Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History (1): 58-80. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 56 – 
Gómez, José María, Miguel Verdú, Adela González-Megías, and Marcos Méndez. 2016. The 
Phylogenetic Roots of Human Lethal Violence. Nature 538 (13 October): 223-237. 
Hager, Sandy Brian. 2014. What Happened to the Bondholding Class? Public Debt, Power and 
the Top One Per Cent. New Political Economy 19 (2, March): 155-182. 
Hager, Sandy Brian. 2015. Corporate Ownership of the Public Debt: Mapping the New 
Aristocracy of Finance. Socio-Economic Review. 
Hager, Sandy Brian. 2016. Public Debt, Inequality and Power. The Making of a Modern Debt State. 
Oakland, California: University of California Press. 
Hamilton, W. D. 1964a. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 7 (1). 
Hamilton, W. D. 1964b. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. II. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 7 (1). 
Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun, and Yanis Varoufakis. 2004. Game Theory. A Critical Text. 2nd ed. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Herbert, Frank. 1965. Dune. New York: Ace Books. 
Houellebecq, Michel. 2000. The Elementary Particles. Translated from the French by Frank 
Wynne. New York: Knopf. 
Houellebecq, Michel. 2005. The Possibility of an Island. Translated from the French by Gavin 
Bowd. 1st American ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Howard, Philip H. 2016. Concentration and Power in the Food System: Who Controls What We Eat?, 
Contemporary food studies: economy, culture and politics,. New York, NY: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Huxley, Aldous. 1932. Brave New World. With a special Forward by the author. New York: The 
Modern Library. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1923. A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan and co., 
limited. 
Knorr-Cetina, Karin. 1999. Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Kramer, Samuel Noah. 1948. Review of The Intellectual Adventre of Ancient Man: An Essay on 
Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East by H. Frankfort; H. A. Frankfort; John A. 
Wilson; Thorkild Jacobson; William A. Irwin. Journal of Cuneiform Studies 2 (1): 33-70. 
Kramer, Samuel Noah. 1963. The Sumerians. Their History, Culture, and Character. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Lee, John W. I. 2007. A Greek Army on the March. Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lovelock, James. 1972. Gaia as Seen Through the Atmosphere. Atmospheric Environment 6 (8): 
579-514. 
Lovelock, James 2000. Gaia. The Practical Science of Planetary Medicine. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lovelock, James, and Lynn Margulis. 1974. Atmospheric Homeostasis by and for the 
Biosphere: The Gaia Hypothesis. Tellus 26 (2). 
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1532. [2003]. The Prince and Other Writings. Translated by W. A. 
Rebhorn. New York: Barnes & Noble Classics. 
Mandel, Ernest. 1962. Marxist Economic Theory. 2 vols. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 57 – 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1955. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Humanitas 
Beacon Studies in Humanities. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1968. Negations. Essays in Critical Theory. With translations from the German 
by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Marglin, Stephen A. 1974. What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in 
Capitalist Production. Review of Radical Political Economics 6 (2, July): 60-112. 
Margulis, Lynn. 1967. On the Origins of Mitosing Cells. Journal of Theoretical Biology 14 (3, 
March): 255-274. 
Margulis, Lynn, and Dorion Sagan. 1997. Microcosmos. Four Billion Years of Evolution From Our 
Microbial Ancestors. Foreword by Lewis Thomas. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Marshall, Alfred. 1920. Principles of Economics. An Introductory Volume. 8th ed. London: 
Macmillan. 
Martin, Ulf. 2016. Pseudorational Control and the Magma of Reality. Unpublished paper 
presented at the Department of Political Science, York University, September 27: 1-37. 
McCullough, Colleen. 1990. The First Man in Rome. 1st ed. New York: Morrow. 
McMahon, James. 2013. The Rise of a Confident Hollywood: Risk and the Capitalization of 
Cinema. Review of Capital as Power 1 (1): 23-40. 
McMahon, James. 2015. What Makes Hollywood Run? Capitalist Power, Risk and the Control of 
Social Creativity. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Graduate Program in Social and Political 
Thought, York University. 
Mengistu, Henok, Joost Huizinga, Jean-Baptiste Mouret, and Jeff Clune. 2016. The 
Evolutionary Origins of Hierarchy. PLoS Computational Biology 12 (6, June): 1-23. 
Milanovic, Branko, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2011. Pre-Industrial 
Inequality. The Economic Journal 121 (551, March): 255-272. 
Morris, Ian. 2013. The Measure of Civilization. How Social Development Decides the Fate of Nations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Mumford, Lewis. 1967. The Myth of the Machine. Technics and Human Development. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 
Mumford, Lewis. 1970. The Myth of the Machine. The Pentagon of Power. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
Murphy, Tom. 2011. Galactic-Scale Energy. https://dothemath.ucsd.edu/2011/07/galactic-
scale-energy/. Do the Math, July 12. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. 1989. Price and Quantity Measurements: Theoretical Biases in Empirical 
Procedures. Working Paper 14/1989, Department of Economics, McGill University, 
Montreal, pp. 1-24. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. 1992. Inflation as Restructuring. A Theoretical and Empirical Account of the U.S. 
Experience. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Economics, McGill University. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. 1996. Israel and South Africa: Prospects for Their Transitions. Emerging 
Markets Analyst 4 (10, February): 12-18. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. 1998. Differential Accumulation: Toward a New Political Economy of 
Capital. Review of International Political Economy 5 (2): 169-216. 
Nitzan, Jonathan. 2001. Regimes of Differential Accumulation: Mergers, Stagflation and the 
Logic of Globalization. Review of International Political Economy 8 (2): 226-274. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 1995. Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In: The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition -- Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle-
East "Energy Conflicts". Review of International Political Economy 2 (3): 446-515. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 58 – 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2000. Capital Accumulation: Breaking the Dualism 
of "Economics" and "Politics". In Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, edited by 
R. Palan. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 67-88. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2001. Going Global: Differential Accumulation and 
the Great U-turn in South Africa and Israel. Review of Radical Political Economics 33: 21-55. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2002. The Global Political Economy of Israel. London: 
Pluto Press. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2007. War Profits, Peace Dividends. Hebrew. 2nd 
Expanded and Revised ed. Haifa: Pardes. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2009. Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder. 
RIPE Series in Global Political Economy. New York and London: Routledge. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2014a. Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? Three 
Views on Economic Policy in Times of Crisis. Review of Capital as Power 1 (1): 110-155. 
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2014b. The Capitalist Algorithm. Reflections on 
Robert Harris' The Fear Index. Real-World Economics Review (67, May): 137-142. 
Ostojić, Mladen. 2015a. Differential Taxation: A Convergence of Interests between American 
Banking and Government. Transnational Institute, January 14, pp. 1-17. 
Ostojić, Mladen. 2015b. Differential Taxation: The Case of American Banking. Unpublished 
Master Research Paper (MRP), Department of Political Science, York University, Canada, 
pp. 1-27. 
Park, Hyeng-Joon. 2013. Dominant Capital and the Transformation of Korean Capitalism: From Cold 
War to Globalization. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, York 
University, Toronto. 
Park, Hyeng-Joon. 2016. Korea’s Post-1997 Restructuring: An Analysis of Capital as Power. 
Review of Radical Political Economics 48 (2, May): 287-309. 
Park, Hyeng-Joon, and Jamie Doucette. 2016. Financialization or Capitalization? Debating 
Capitalist Power in South Korea in the Context of Neoliberal Globalization Capital & Class 
OnlineFirst (September 26): 1-22. 
Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature. Why Violence Has Declined. New York: 
Viking. 
Price, T. Douglas, and Gary M. Feinman, eds. 2010. Pathways to Power. New Perspectives on the 
Emergence of Social Inequality. New York and London: Springer. 
Remarque, Erich Maria. 1954. A Time to Love and a Time to Die. Translated from the German 
by Denver Lindley. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Stapledon, Olaf. 1930. Last and First Men. A Story of the Near and Far Future. London: Methuen 
& co. ltd. 
Stapledon, Olaf. 1937. Star Maker. London Methuen & co. ltd.,. 
Sweezy, Paul M. 1991. Monopoly Capital After Twenty-Five Years. Monthly Review 43 (7): 52-
57. 
Taagepera, Rein. 1997. Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for 
Russia. International Studies Quarterly 41 (3, September): 475-504. 
Tainter, Joseph A. 1988. The Collapse of Complex Societies, New Studies in Archaeology. Cambridge, 
Cambridgeshire and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tainter, Joseph A. 2000. Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability. Population and 
Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1, September): 3-41. 
 
BICHLER & NITZAN • Growing through Sabotage 
– 59 – 
Teresi, Dick. 2011. Discover Interview: Lynn Margulis Says She's Not Controversial. She's 
Right. Discover, June 17. 
Trigger, Bruce G. 2003. Understanding Early Civilizations. A Comparative Study. Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Turchin, Peter. 2016. Ultrasociety. How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators 
on Earh. Chaplin, Connecticut: Beresta Books. 
Turchin, Peter, and Sergey Gavrilets. 2009. Evolution of Complex Hierarchical Societies. Social 
Evolution & History 8 (2): 167-198. 
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1991. Global Arms Trade. OTA-ISC-460, 
June. Washington D.C.: GPO. 
Varoufakis, Yanis. 2008. Capitalism According to Evolutionary Game Theory: The 
Impossibility of a Sufficiently Evolutionary Model of Historical Change. Science & Society 
72 (1, January): 63-94. 
Veblen, Thorstein. 1919. [1934]. The Vested Interest and the State of Industrial Arts. New York: B. 
W. Huebsch. 
Veblen, Thorstein. 1923. [1967]. Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times. The 
Case of America. With an introduction by Robert Leckachman. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Vitali, Stefania, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston. 2011. The Network of Global 
Corporate Control. Plos ONE 6 (10): 1-6. 
Wicksell, Knut. 1935. Lectures On Political Economy. Translated from the Swedish by E. Classen 
and Edited with an Introduction by L. Robbins. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: George Routledge 
& Sons. 
Xenophon. 1901. The March of the Ten Thousand. Translation of the Anabasis, preceded by a 
life of Xenophen, by H. G. Dakyns, M.A. Reprinted with Corrections from Volume I of 
The works of Xenophon, translated. by H.G. Dakyns, 1890. London and New York: The 
Macmillan company. 
 
